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ABSTRACT
The positive stock price reaction associated with the
announcement of a corporate spinoff is we11-documented but
not yet explained.

This work offers a new hypothesis:

investor sentiment may affect the market response to the
announcement of a spinoff.

The results of an investigation

using market-oriented proxies for investor sentiment
support this hypothesis.

Results of an analysis using non-

market proxies for investor sentiment are not consistent
with the above hypothesis.

An analysis of the long-term

effects on shareholder wealth of spinoffs is also
conducted.

It is found that pre and post-spinoff

performance cannot be considered (statistically)
significantly different.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
During the decade of the 1980's, there was a marked
increase in the frequency of events that are generally
referred to as corporate restructuring.

This decade is

notable as a period of vigorous merger activity,
reminiscent of the merger "wave" of the late 1960's,
resulting in an acceleration in the pace of change in the
ownership structure of U.S. corporations.

Less well-

publicized, however, is a parallel trend in the number of
corporate divestitures.
As is often the case, this market activity has
inspired renewed academic interest in the restructuring
issue.

Specifically, over the past few years, the merger

and LBO phenomena have come under intense scrutiny.

Less

well-examined, however, are issues regarding those types of
reorganization that result in a smaller corporate entity.
In particular, although the corporate merger has been the
focus of a number of dissertations and countless academic
articles, the "demerger" or spinoff has received far less
attention.
While a merger creates one firm where before there
were two, the spinoff reverses this procedure and produces
two separate corporate entities from one.

In a typical

spinoff a large conglomerate divests one of its
subsidiaries, often one in a different industry than that
of the parent.

However, the business unit spun off is not
1
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always an existing subsidiary; it is sometimes a collection
of heretofore unrelated assets, grouped for the express
purpose of forming a segment to be divested.

Also,

occasionally more than one subsidiary or operating segment
is spun off, and a spinoff is sometimes only one element of
a much larger corporate restructuring.
The operations of each business unit of the newly
divided firm typically remain unchanged.

Although the spun

off segment of the corporation becomes an independent firm,
the constituent components of this demerger are still
related through common ownership. This is so because the
pre-spinoff shareholders of the parent organization receive
a pro-rata share of the spun off corporation's equity.
This continuity of ownership differentiates spinoffs from
other types of divestitures, which generally involve an
exchange of the firm's assets for cash or other means of
compensation.
On average, divestitures seem to elicit a positive
stock price reaction from the market on the day(s) on which
the restructuring is announced (for example, see Rosenfeld,
(1984) and Zaima and Hearth,
(1983)

(1985)).

Shipper and Smith

report a two-day cumulative return of approximately

3.0% for a sample of spinoffs that took place between 1963
and 1981.

Various explanations for this market reaction to

the announcement of a spinoff have been advanced.

Nevertheless, to date none has proved completely
satisfactory explanations of the spinoff phenomenon.
An early hypothesis to explain the observed positive
shareholder wealth effects of spinoffs is bondholder
expropriation.

Underlying the expropriation hypothesis is

the notion that a spinoff involves a wealth transfer
between the firm's securityholders rather than an increase
in firm value.

In this view, the shareholders are thought

to "steal" a portion of the bondholder's collateral by
dividing the firm and reducing the assets to which the
bondholders have claim.

Hite and Owers (1983) and Schipper

and Smith (1983) reject this hypothesis, however, by
demonstrating 1) that the spun off subsidiary is typically
assigned a proportionate amount of the corporation's total
debt, and 2) that bond prices and ratings are usually
unaffected by the announcement of a spinoff.
Currently, the specialization hypothesis is probably
the most widely accepted explanation regarding the stock
price reaction to corporate spinoffs.

This argument

emphasizes managerial focus, and is rooted in the
transactions cost theory of the firm associated with the
work of Coase (1937).

Diseconomies of decision-making are

assumed to arise once the firm reaches some unspecified
critical size and are exacerbated if there exist
subsidiaries that operate in different industries than the
parent.

A divestiture of one or more of the subsidiaries

allows the executives of each business segment to better
manage the resources of the separate firms.

This argument

may be viewed as the converse of the synergy explanation in
the merger literature and the two share a common problem in
empirical testing:

the difficulty of formulating refutable

hypotheses that are sufficiently distinct.
Other explanations regarding the shareholder wealth
effects of spinoffs offered in the divestiture literature
include the regulatory hypothesis, the union hypothesis,
and the merger hypothesis.
Schipper and Smith,

(Hite and Owers,

(1983)).

(1983) and

The first rationale posits

escape from some type of regulatory interference as
creating the wealth resulting from the divestiture.

The

union hypothesis suggests that labor union containment
(dividing the firm into union and non-union segments) may
be beneficial to shareholders.

Finally, it appears that

some firms spinoff a subsidiary to facilitate a merger
between the spun off firm and a third corporation.

These

three hypotheses appear to motivate a number of the
observed spinoffs.

However, the majority of demergers do

not appear to fit into any one of these three categories.
Given the lack of a satisfactory explanation for the
positive wealth effects associated with the demerger
phenomenon in the literature, it is the objective of this
study to formulate a new hypothesis regarding investor
reaction to a spinoff announcement.
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Since the operations of each segment of the divided
firm usually do not change after the divestiture, the
economic rationale motivating corporate spinoffs may be
difficult for investors to perceive.

It is possible that

the initial reaction to this event is not based at all on
enhanced economic value.

While the long-term wealth

effects of spinoffs may be difficult for investors to
evaluate, the circumstances surrounding the announcement of
the typical spinoff are such that investors could be
overly-optimistic about the prospects of the newly divided
firm.

The hypothesis developed here and termed the

Positive Reaction to Non-Negative Information (PRNI)
hypothesis posits that the announcement day returns of
spinoff firms are inflated by the optimistic expectations
of investors.
Although the stock price reaction to the announcement
of a corporate spinoff has been thoroughly investigated (if
not explained), the long-term effects of a demerger on
shareholder wealth have been the subject of few empirical
studies.

Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1991) find that a

sample of spun off subsidiaries outperform a market proxy
and a sample of size and industry matched firms over a 36
month holding period.

While making a significant

contribution to the divestiture literature, that study
ignores an important aspect of the long-term effects of
corporate spinoffs.

The post-spinoff performance of parent

firms is at least as important as that of spun off
subsidiaries, since the parent firm is typically the larger
entity and therefore retains the bulk of the equity of the
original corporation.
This study also investigates the long-term shareholder
wealth effects associated with corporate spinoffs.

The

post-spinoff performance of parent firms as well as that of
spun off subsidiaries is considered.

Rather than compare

portfolio performance to that of the market or a sample of
"matched" firms, more traditional measures of portfolio
performance are used.

Use of the Jensen (1968), Sharpe

(1966) and Treynor (1965) measures of portfolio performance
should provide a more precise evaluation of portfolio risk
and are therefore more informative regarding the long-term
return properties of spinoff firms.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 contains a review of the relevant literature and
a discussion of the institutional issues regarding
spinoffs.

In Chapter 3, the PRNI hypothesis is presented

and its implications are discussed.

An event study

examining the short-term effects of spinoffs and testing
the PRNI hypothesis are the subject of Chapter 4.

The

long-term (portfolio) effects of the spinoff are analyzed
in Chapter 5.
in Chapter 6.

Finally, summary and conclusions are offered

CHAPTER 2:

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Divestitures
The spinoff is merely one method by which a firm may
divest a portion of its total assets.

Other forms of

corporate divestiture include the splitoff, in which one or
more shareholders of the parent firm exchange their stock
in the parent firm for stock in the subsidiary.

In a

split-up, the parent firm is divided into several parts,
the equity of each part is distributed among the parent's
shareholders, and then the parent is dissolved.

The most

popular type of divestiture is the selloff, which involves
the sale of some portion of the assets of one firm to
another firm.

In most cases, the asset becomes a

subsidiary or division of the purchasing firm.
Virtually all of the published empirical research
examining the wealth effects of divestiture has considered
either selloffs or spinoffs or both.

The bulk of this

empirical evidence suggests that the announcement of a
divestiture is generally associated with a positive stock
price reaction for the divesting firm.

An early empirical

study examining the wealth effects of corporate divestiture
is that of Boudreaux (1975), who investigates the stock
price reaction to the announcement of 138 voluntary and 31
involuntary divestitures over the period 1965-1970.

For

the sub-sample of voluntary divestitures, Boudreaux finds
an "unusually positive" price movement for the three months
7

preceding and one month following the announcement.
Boudreaux's sub-sample of voluntary divestitures contains
both spinoffs and selloffs; unfortunately, no attempt is
made to distinguish differential effects (if any) between
these two forms of divestiture.
Using daily data, Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer
(1984)

(ABK) and Hearth and Zaima (1984) restrict their

respective samples to voluntary selloffs, and each find
that the announcement of such an event results in positive
abnormal returns.

Consistent with the findings of the bulk

of the divestiture literature, Hearth and Zaima find an
upward "drift" in share price for several weeks immediately
prior to the announcement date.

In contrast, ABK report a

negative trend in share price over the weeks prior to the
announcement date.
Rosenfeld (1984) investigates stock price reaction
to both selloffs and spinoffs and concludes that although
each has a positive effect on stock price, the effect of
the latter is larger in magnitude than the former.

The

author suggests that this difference is due to the
different circumstances typically surrounding the two types
of divestitures.

Specifically, selloffs are often

precipitated by poor economic performance by the parent
firm, while this is usually not true of spinoffs.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Hearth and Zaima (1984)
report that the announcement of a selloff by relatively

"healthy" firms has a stronger positive effect on share
price than the same announcement by their less successful
counterparts.
Zaima and Hearth (1985) examine the wealth effects of
voluntary selloffs with respect to the division of economic
gains between the divesting and acquiring firms.

The

authors conclude that while shareholders of acquiring firms
may realize some economic gains from selloffs, the majority
of economic gains accrue to the shareholders of divesting
firms.

Although there is some evidence of a positive price

movement around the announcement (of acquisition) date for
acquiring firms, there is no evidence that these price
movements are significant.

Zaima and Hearth (1985) also

document an empirical relationship they reported elsewhere:
the positive correlation between relative size of the
assets divested and stock price reaction at the
announcement date.

2.2. Institutional Issues
The typical sequence of events for a corporation
undertaking a spinoff is as follows:

1)

Management announces that it plans to

divest a portion of the firm through a pro-rata
distribution of new shares to shareholders of the
parent company.

Shareholder approval is sought

if required by the parent's corporate bylaws.

If

shareholder approval is required, a special
shareholders' meeting is called.

At this meeting

(or by proxy), shareholders are asked to approve
the plan of reorganization.

The plan of

reorganization contains details of the mechanics
of the spinoff, including the relationship
between parent and subsidiary during and after
the spinoff.

Any exchanges of assets and

liabilities between parent and subsidiary that
are part of the overall restructuring are
included.

Other items generally contained in a

plan of reorganization are the number of shares
of stock to be distributed, record and payment
dates for the distribution, and the proposed
exchange listing for the subsidiary.

2)

The board of directors reviews and approves

the plan of reorganization.

3)

The company seeks and is granted a favorable

ruling from the IRS.

If the proposed spinoff meets

the requirements of Section 355 of the Internal
Revenue Code, the distribution of the subsidiary's
stock to the shareholders of the parent firm is
considered a stock dividend by the IRS, and is

therefore tax-free to the recipients until the stock
is sold.

In order to qualify for tax-free status, the

spinoff must be motivated by "business considerations"
and not by tax avoidance.

Examples of allowable

business considerations are to expand credit for one
or both corporations, to separate businesses to allow
employees to share in the profits of ownership and to
make the subsidiary's stock more acceptable in a
merger.

Note that this list is not exhaustive.

Additionally, the Tax Code requires that parent
and subsidiary must be actively engaged in business
for at least five years before the spinoff and that
there exists no pre-arranged plan for all the
shareholders to sell off the subsidiary stock after
the distribution.

Other criteria that must be

satisfied to qualify a spinoff as a dividend include
the directive that the distribution must constitute at
least 80% of the outstanding shares of the subsidiary.
Finally, any shares retained by the parent must not
constitute "practical control" of the subsidiary.
Failure to satisfy these conditions can result in the
tax treatment of the spinoff shares as dividend income
to the parent company shareholders in the year of
receipt.

4)

The shareholders approve the plan of

reorganization.

5)

The company files a registration statement

for the subsidiary with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.

A prospectus must be

provided to all stockholders who will receive
stock in the spinoff.

The subsidiary must meet

all reporting guidelines required by the SEC for
publicly traded corporations.
Prior to 1969, the tax rules were the only
regulations in place regarding spinoffs, since the SEC
considered a spinoff a dividend, not a sale of
securities.

Therefore, the registration requirements

for publicly traded securities under the Securities
Act of 1933 did not apply to the equity or debt of
spun off firms.

This "loophole" in registration

requirements led the SEC to suspect that spinoffs were
being used to avoid the disclosures of information
required for public corporations.

In order to prevent

possible abuses, in July 1969 the SEC issued a
directive stating that spinoff stock should be
registered if the shares are issued with the intent of
resale.

13

6)

The subsidiary's shares are distributed to

the parent company's shareholders on a pro-rata
basis.

The shares are typically distributed six

months after the initial announcement, although
the time period between public announcement and
completion of the spinoff may be as short as two
months or as long as several years.

Whether or not the conversion and exercise prices of
warrants and convertible securities are adjusted for the
effects of the demerger depends on their terms as described
in the corporate charter.

Some firms are not required to

adjust the terms of these securities at all.

More

typically, the parent firm modifies their terms by
multiplying the number of shares received upon exercise or
conversion by the ratio of the market value of the parent
firm including the subsidiary to the market value of the
parent firm excluding the subsidiary.

The value of

outstanding options received through a stock option plan is
usually preserved in a similar fashion:

the number of

shares obtainable at exercise is adjusted upward, and the
exercise price downward.
Most firms that are large enough to engage in a
spinoff have established retirement plans for the benefit
of their employees.

The subsidiary typically establishes a

plan similar to that of the parent, into which the assets

14

of employees of the spun off firm are transferred.

The

subsidiary then assumes responsibility for the unfunded
liability of its pension plan.

Years of service with the

parent company usually count toward eligibility and
increase the level of retirement benefits for employees of
the spun off subsidiary.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the spinoff is
that, on average, it seems to be a value creating event.
That is, there appear to be gains associated with the act
of separating one firm into two entities.

This

circumstance is especially intriguing when one considers
that mergers are also value creating events (at least
initially - see Jensen and Ruback,

(1983)).

As many

authors point out, (for example, Hite and Owers,

(1983))

potential synergies may well increase the aggregate market
value of two merging firms.

Since a demerger is the direct

opposite of the merger the synergy argument cannot hold.
Abstracting from synergies and assuming frictionless
capital markets, spinoffs that do not affect cash flows
should not affect market value.

It is probably safe to

assume that the majority of spinoffs do not affect cash
flows because, typically, the operations of each segment
remains unchanged.

Why then should a mere reconfiguration

of the equity of a corporation increase the market value of
the firm?

15

2.3. Extant Hypotheses
Possible explanations include one proposed by
Hakansson (1982), who demonstrates that if financial
markets are incomplete, a spinoff can increase the
opportunity set available to investors.

Litzenberger and

Sosin (1977) suggest that if there exist differential
growth opportunities between the subsidiary and parent, a
spinoff can provide investors with more flexibility vis-a1vis the capital gains/dividends alternatives.

That is, if

the subsidiary has substantial growth opportunities while
the parent is capable of paying a relatively high dividend,
investors who prefer capital gains may choose to hold
shares only in the subsidiary, and investors who prefer
dividends will retain only the parent's stock.
Another explanation for the positive stock-price
reaction associated with spinoffs is that value is not
created at all, but that there is merely a wealth transfer
from the senior security holders (debt and preferred stock)
to the equity holders.

Galai and Masulis (1976) suggest

that with a spinoff, the stockholders may be able to "steal
away" a part of the bondholder's collateral, since they
(the bondholders) have no claim on the assets of the new
firm. Naturally, this argument assumes:
1) that the bondholders are unable to foresee the
possibility of such maneuvering on the part of the
shareholders, or

16

2) that the bondholders are unable either to prevent
spinoffs (through debt covenants) or to charge an
appropriate rate to compensate for this risk.
In somewhat the same vein, Myers (1977) argues that
firms with risky debt may reject positive net present value
projects, since it is possible that some projects may
enhance overall firm value but leave the shareholders no
better (or worse) off.

A relevant example given by Miles

and Rosenfeld (1983) is as follows:

a subsidiary has

positive net present value projects that are rejected
because the benefits will accrue to the bondholders of the
parent.

If the subsidiary is spun off, then all the

benefits will accrue to the shareholders of the spun off
corporation.

Thus a spinoff announcement might increase

the value of the (parent) firm's equity by the net present
value of these investment opportunities.
The elimination of negative synergies between the
parent and subsidiary may serve to explain the generally
positive reaction to spinoffs.

For example, if the parent

and subsidiary operate in disparate industries, there may
be an advantage in allowing each firm to "stick to its
knitting", and eliminating the managerial distraction of an
unnatural corporate relationship.

As argued by Schipper

and Smith (1983), divesting firms may have reached the
point of diminishing marginal returns to management.

These

firms divest to reduce the number and complexity of their
managerial contracts.

This rationale is known as the

17

"specialization" hypothesis.

A spinoff undertaken for

specialization purposes may be viewed as the converse of a
conglomerate merger.
It has been suggested in the literature that there may
be a legal or regulatory basis for the positive stock price
reaction generally associated with spinoffs.

If the nature

of a subsidiary's operations cause it to fall under the
supervision of a state or federal regulatory agency, it is
often the case that the parent’s operations are subject to
the scrutiny of the same regulatory agency.

For example,

if a financial services holding company owns a bank as a
subsidiary operation, the parent firm as well as the
subsidiary bank may be forced to adhere to policies set by
bank regulators.

Another example might be the spinoff of a

foreign subsidiary by a US corporation, which would free
the parent from restrictions imposed by Congress on
domestic firms that have operations abroad.

There may be a

tax advantage in spinning off a foreign subsidiary, since
the spun off firm is required to pay corporate taxes only
to the nation in which the company operates.

If this rate

is lower than the US corporate tax rate, the shareholders
may benefit.

Naturally, any dividends paid to US citizens

by a foreign company are taxed at the prevailing US rate.
Similarly, a spinoff may allow a subsidiary to avoid
burdensome obligations associated with the parent’s labor
union.

Attempting to contain union-organizing activities

18

is an acceptable business purpose to spinoff a subsidiary,
according to Section 355 of the Tax Code.

The National

Labor Relations Board and a federal appeals court have held
that a spun off firm does not share automatically in the
parent's collective bargaining agreements.

If a spinoff is

not solely motivated by a desire to avoid labor
obligations, the spun off firm may be considered a "new"
firm as far as organized labor is concerned (Schipper and
Smith,

(1983)).

Hite and Owers (1983) argue that spinoffs precipitated
by (potential) legal or regulatory difficulties should
decrease the value of the firm.

In this case, the decision

to spinoff is prompted by potential interference with the
firm's desired activities.

Hite and Owers (1983) maintain

that if the combined operations of parent and subsidiary
are optimal in an unconstrained situation, then separation
of the two units induced by legal or regulatory impediments
can only reduce total firm value.

On the other hand,

merger considerations may enhance the value of a firm
executing a spinoff.

It appears that rather than sell a

subsidiary directly for cash, some firms spinoff the
subsidiary first, and then the acquiring firm negotiates
with the shareholders in a "partial merger".

The generally

positive stock returns to target firms upon the
announcement of a merger might explain the positive returns
observed upon the announcement of a spinoff.
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Another rationale for the stock price reaction to
spinoffs found in the literature is a hypothesis advanced
by Mauer and Lewellen (1990).

Their argument is based on

the tax circumstances of the securityholders of the firms
involved in the spinoff.

By way of exposition, Mauer and

Lewellen (1990) offer the example of an unlevered firm that
has asset investments in two different lines of business.
Since these two investments are in different lines of
business, they will have operating returns, and therefore
market values, that are imperfectly correlated.
The market value of the combined firm will be the
market value of its component businesses, and this value
will fluctuate with changes in the value of each component.
If the combined firm chooses to spinoff one of its
component businesses and distribute the common stock of the
new firm to its existing shareholders, investors may then
experience (and realize) capital gains and losses from
their holdings in each corporation.
In the post-spinoff period, the net change in
shareholder wealth will be no different from the situation
where the corporation remained a single entity.

However,

investors now may trade separately on the movements of the
market values of each company.

The advantage of this

circumstance over the previous corporate structure to
investors is the ability to realize capital losses for tax
purposes when the market values of the two firms change in
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opposite directions.

As Mauer and Lewellen (1990) point

out, if the market value of one of the firms increases and
the other decreases, then investors may realize the full
loss of the latter, given separate corporate organization,
whereas the losses of one component of a combined firm
might be "swamped" by the gains of the other division.
Constantinides (1983) and Constantinides and Ingersoll
(1984)

have shown that immediately realizing all capital

losses in order to take the associated tax deductions (but
deferring all capital gains) is optimal tax-trading
behavior in an environment of fluctuating securities
prices.

Another implication of their research is that the

ability to implement such a strategy offers to investors a
valuable tax-timing option that may contribute
significantly to the value of an investment in any given
security.
Masulis,

Consistent with option pricing models (Galai and
(1976)), the value of this option increases with

the variance of the underlying security.
An argument similar to that of Mauer and Lewellen is
presented by Sarig (1985).

He demonstrates, in an Arrow-

Debreu framework, that mergers reduce the aggregate value
of the merging firm's outstanding securities, and
conversely, divesting economically unrelated lines of
business should increase the aggregate value of corporate
securities.

Sarig points out that the shareholders'

limited liability is the principal advantage of the
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corporate form of organization.

He argues that by

combining two corporations, the shareholders have lost the
valuable option of forfeiting their claim on the assets of
one of the firms, should either company become insolvent.
This option is more valuable, the author submits, when the
returns on the two firms are more negatively correlated.
Perhaps the most general hypothesis regarding the
market's reaction to spinoffs is proposed by Hite and Owers
(1983), who suggest that the gains realized by dividing the
firm are explained by the savings from using separate
specialized contracts in which the parent and subsidiary
have comparative advantages.

Hite and Owers posit that

spinoffs are associated with changes in the firm's
opportunity set.

In this scenario, the demerger better

positions the corporate entity (as a whole) to exploit the
new state of the world.

However, since the revelation of

the change in the firm's opportunity set coincides with the
spinoff announcement, it is difficult (if not impossible)
to separate the individual effects of the two factors.
Miller (1977) has advanced a clientele argument to
explain the apparent shareholder wealth gains associated
with spinoff announcements.

That is, the total value of

the parts can be greater than that of the whole if
investors hold divergent opinions with regard to the
prospects of each division.

In this situation, each of the

spun off segments of the firm may be marketed to the group
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of investors with the most optimistic expectations of that
segment's future performance.

Schnabel (1992) duplicates

Miller's rather ad hoc argument in a more rigorous
framework, also demonstrating that binding short sales
constraints are a sufficient (and necessary) condition to
induce value subadditivity (the whole being worth less than
the sum of the parts).

2.4. Market Reaction to Spinoff Announcements
Kudla and Mclnish (1983) report a positive stock price
reaction to spinoff announcements; however, data
limitations flaw this study. (The sample size is six firms,
and the day that the new shares are distributed is used as
the event day.)

A more thorough investigation of the

market reaction to spinoff announcements is conducted by
Hite and Owers (1983), who examine 123 voluntary spinoffs
that occurred during 1962-1981.

The authors, using the

event study method and daily data, analyze security price
reactions around the spinoff announcements in order to
determine the magnitude and possible sources of valuation
changes.
Hite and Owers (1983) compute market-adjusted excess
returns from 50 days before the announcement date through
the reporting of the completion of the spinoff plan.

The

authors find a statistically significant price increase, on
average, over the 50 day period prior to the announcement
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date and over the two day "announcement window" (days -1 to
0) of 3.30%.
Another empirical study examining the spinoff
phenomenon is that of Schipper and Smith (1983).

In spite

of some similarities, there do exist significant
differences in the findings of these two studies.

Also

using the event study method, Schipper and Smith (1983)
investigate the cumulative prediction errors from the
market model for 93 firms that voluntarily spun off a
subsidiary between the years 1962 and 1982.

In contrast to

the results obtained by Hite and Owers (1983), Schipper and
Smith (1983) find no statistically significant trend over
the pre-event period.

This absence of an upward price

drift in the months prior to the spinoff announcement is at
variance with the results obtained by most researchers.
The authors report a positive cumulative abnormal return
(2.84%) over the (-1 to 0) event window.
A fourth empirical examination of the effects of
voluntary spinoff announcements on shareholder wealth is
that of Miles and Rosenfeld (1983).

Consistent with the

results obtained by Hite and Owers (1983), Miles and
Rosenfeld find the pre-announcement returns (day -120 to
day -11) to be significantly positive.

Consistent with the

results of both of the previous studies, the two day
announcement period return is also significantly positive
(3.34%).

As noted by Hite and Owers (1983), the pattern of
cumulative excess returns observed by the majority of
researchers represents two phenomena.

First, the spinoff

firms, on average, experience good stock market performance
for several months immediately prior to the announcement
day.

Second, the announcement, on average, is associated

with significantly positive stock price reactions.

Since

this evidence appears to be consistent with wealth gains
for shareholders, the next obvious avenue of inquiry is
investigation of potential sources of these wealth gains.

2.5. Tests of Hypotheses
As discussed above, one possible explanation for the
apparent shareholder wealth gains resulting from spinoffs
suggested in the literature is bondholder expropriation.
In order to test the expropriation hypothesis, Hite and
Owers examine the senior security returns as well as common
stock returns around the spinoff announcement.

In an

examination of the prediction errors of samples of straight
bonds, convertible bonds and preferred stock of the
demerging firms, the authors find positive, but
statistically insignificant results.

This work directly

contradicts the expropriation hypothesis, since one would
expect a negative price reaction for these securities (and
a positive price reaction of common stocks) if the
bondholders' wealth was indeed diminished by a spinoff.
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Additionally, if the expropriation hypothesis were
correct, one would expect to observe the most strongly
negative price reactions by the bonds of those firms whose
equity increased the most.

In fact, Hite and Owers (1983)

find that the returns of the non-convertible debt
instruments (straight debt and preferred stock) had no
statistically significant correlation with those of the
equity.
Interestingly, although more than half of the bonds
showed positive abnormal returns, more than half of the
preferred stock abnormal returns were negative.

Not

surprisingly, the convertible securities' price reaction to
the spinoff announcement was the most similar to that of
the common stock; positive and statistically significant.
Schipper and Smith (1983) point out that the spinoff
induced wealth transfer described by Galai and Masulis
requires exclusive distribution of the equity of the new
firm to the parent firm's shareholders.

There is a wealth

transfer to the extent that the bondholders' collateral has
been reduced.

Schipper and Smith (1983) analyze their data

and find that firms routinely assign debt to spun off
subsidiaries (64 of 93 firms).

The authors also find that

the leverage of spun off firms is similar to that of pre
spinoff firms.

Another test of the bondholder

expropriation hypothesis involves the impact of a spinoff
on bond prices and ratings.

Schipper and Smith find a low
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frequency of declines in bond prices and ratings associated
with spinoff announcements, additional evidence
contradicting the expropriation hypothesis.
The evidence regarding spinoffs undertaken to
facilitate a merger is not as unambiguous as that
concerning the bondholder expropriation hypothesis.

Hite

and Owers (1983) include 12 firms in their sample that were
preparing for a merger by spinning off a subsidiary into a
free-standing unit.

When the data were categorized by

reason given (by management) for the spinoff, this portion
of the total sample displayed the largest positive
cumulative prediction errors over the announcement day
window.
Unfortunately, because the announcement of the spinoff
often coincides with that of the merger, it is not possible
to disentangle the separate effects of each.

Since merger

announcements are known to induce positive stock price
reactions for the target firm, it is not clear how much of
the price increase is due to the impending merger, and how
much (if any) is due to the spinoff itself.
The specialization hypothesis is also tested by Hite
and Owers (1983).

Recall that this explanation involves

the spinoff of a subsidiary in a fundamentally different
line of business from that of the parent, which may allow
each to focus on "the business at hand."

Again, the

authors disaggregate their sample, categorizing by
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management’s stated motivation for the spinoff, and find 27
firms that appear to fall into the specialization category.
The cumulative abnormal prediction errors for this group
are positive, and are the largest of any group in the
sample over the entire event period.
A perhaps more painstaking examination of the
specialization hypothesis is conducted by Schipper and
Smith (1983).

These authors provide two measures of the

similarity/dissimilarity of the parent and subsidiary
f irms:
1) industry membership of the parent and subsidiary
2) a comparison of the time series behavior of stock
returns to the value weighted portfolio of parent
and subsidiary versus returns of the parent stock
alone.
Of Schipper and Smith's total sample of 93 firms, 72 spun
off firms were classified in industries different from that
of their parents, and 21 were in the same industry.

The

authors also report that nine of the latter 21 may have
experienced relaxed regulatory or legal constraints.
The second measure of similarity is the extent to
which the parameter estimates of the market model differ
for the pre-spinoff combined firm, and the parent firm
post-spinoff.

The authors report that sufficient data were

available for 62 of the total sample of 93.

The hypothesis

that stock returns follow the same relationship with market
returns after the ex-date as prior to it is rejected at the
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.05 level for 22 firms.

The structural shifts that appear

to have occurred for the 22 firms are primarily increases
in idiosyncratic risk and total return variance.
Naturally, this means that for 40 of the firms tested for a
change in the parameter estimates of the market model, the
null hypothesis of no change could not be rejected.

The

industry information lends a measure of empirical support
to the specialization hypothesis.

However, the fact that

variance increased for roughly one-third of the sample
after the spinoff does not seem to be particularly
informative vis-a'-vis this hypothesis.
Hite and Owers (1983) classify 19 firms as citing
legal or regulatory difficulties as motivation for the
spinoff.

Consistent with their hypothesis regarding this

group, the cumulative excess returns for these firms are
negative over the entire event period.

The

legal/regulatory group is the only such category to display
negative excess returns.

However, the announcement day

returns are positive and statistically significant.
Schipper and Smith (1983) classify 18 firms of their total
sample of 93 as citing relaxation of legal or regulatory
restrictions as motivation for the spinoff.

Consistent

with the results obtained by Hite and Owers, this group of
firms is associated with negative cumulative prediction
errors during the entire event period, and positive returns
on the announcement day.

Kudla and Mclnish (1988) test Miller's (1977)
clientele hypothesis, using relative trading volume before
and after the spinoff as a proxy for the level of
divergence of opinion regarding the prospects of the spun
off segments.

The authors show that the magnitude of the

share price reaction to the announcement of a spinoff is
positively correlated with the increase in trading volume
post-spinoff.

The weak link in this line of research, of

course, is the somewhat curious assumption that a relative
increase in trading volume post-spinoff is indicative of
more greatly diverging opinions.

It seems likely that

trading volume would increase after any important corporate
event; an investigation of the post-announcement trading
volume for a group of merging firms (for example) would
have been informative in this regard.
An interesting empirical result obtained consistently
in the literature is the positive correlation between the
increase in share price upon announcement of the spinoff
and the relative size of the subsidiary being spun off.
Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) divide their sample of 55 firms
into two subsamples based on the size of the spun off unit
relative to the parent firm.

The "large" spinoff group

consists of those firms that divested a subsidiary with an
equity market value of at least 10% of the parent's common
stock (34 firms), while the small group comprises firms
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whose subsidiary had a market value of less than 10% of the
parent (21 firms).
The authors find that the effect of minor spinoffs on
shareholder wealth are small relative to that of major
spinoffs.

Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) report a 20.70%

differential between the two subsamples over the 181-day
event period, which is statistically significant at the 5%
level.

The authors conclude that, for the small spinoff

set, the net present value of the divested unit's cash
flows is trivial relative to the cash flows of the
remaining firm, and therefore has no noticeable influence
on share price.
Hite and Owers (1983) also categorize their sample
according to the size of the division divested.

However,

the fraction of the equity spun off used to partition the
sample is 6.6%.

Consistent with

Miles and Rosenfeld's

results, Hite and Owers find that over the entire event
period, the large spinoffs generate excess returns of 11.6%
and the small spinoffs create excess returns of only 2.7%.
Although the authors call this result "intuitively
appealing", no hypotheses are submitted regarding the
nature of the observed relationship.
Most extant empirical work examining the spinoff
phenomenon has focused on the announcement effects of
demergers.

Relatively little research has addressed the

issue of post-spinoff performance.

This apparent oversight

31

is likely due to data limitations and resulting technical
difficulties.

Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1991)

(CMW)

examine the post-spinoff performance of 146 firms, and find
that, on average, the spun off segment of these firms
significantly outperforms the market, as well as a sample
of matched firms.
CMW investigate the performance of a sample of 146
subsidiaries that were spun-off voluntarily during the
1965-1988 period.

Using both portfolio-rebalancing and

buy-and-hold strategies, the authors find that a portfolio
of spun off firms significantly outperforms both the market
and a sample of size and industry matched firms over a
three year period.

The authors compare the post

announcement day performance of spinoffs and IPOs, since
each is a "new” company to the public markets.
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) and Ritter (1991) have
shown that after superior first day returns, IPOs earn
negative abnormal returns for varying holding periods up to
three years.

In contrast to the early positive returns and

negative long-term performance of IPOs, CMW find that
spinoffs under-perform the market in the distribution
month, and subsequently earn above-market returns for
varying holding periods within a three year time horizon.
The authors report that the strongest performance for their
sample of firms occurs in the second year (between months
12 and 24 relative to the distribution date).

Over a 36 month period, an investment in CMW's sample
of spun off firms would earn a cumulative raw return of
73.8 percent (total return: 106.6 percent assuming monthly
compounding and dividend reinvestment).

After adjusting

for market returns and the returns of the matched sample
firms, abnormal returns for the spinoff sample are in
excess of 20 percent over the three-year period.

These

results are robust with respect to portfolio strategy:
buy-and-hold and portfolio rebalancing produce comparable
results.
CMW speculate that these post-spinoff returns can be
attributed to:
1) enhanced operating performance as a result of a
reduction in agency and overhead costs,
2) market as opposed to administrative capital
allocation,
3) incentives created by more effective compensation
of management, and
4) the potential for asset reallocation to more highly
valued uses through acquisition.
However, they offer no empirical evidence to support these
conjectures.

The possibility of superior performance by

spinoffs raises an interesting question in regard to
capital market efficiency, especially when paired with the
sub-par performance of IPO's.

That is, why do investors

systematically overbid for the shares of IPO's on the offer
day, and consistently underbid for the shares of spun off
subsidiaries when these shares begin trading?

In the case of IPO's, an underwriter underpricing
argument may explain the issue-day returns, but what of the
long-term performance of these shares?

More pertinent for

the purposes of this study is the question:

why do returns

on shares of spun off firms follow the pattern observed by
CMW?

The authors hypothesize that the sub-par performance

of spinoffs in the month of distribution can be attributed
to selling pressure induced by large institutional holders,
who, because of legal or self-imposed restrictions, may not
invest in small firms or firms without a "track record".
After a period of months, the potential number of buyers
for spun off firm's shares increases as the company
establishes a dividend record, earnings history, etc. and
increases the market value of its equity.

This type of

supply/demand argument is at odds with capital market
theory, however.

CHAPTER 3: THE PRNI HYPOTHESIS
Analysis of the stock price reaction to the
announcement of a corporate spinoff has been conclusive:
without exception, researchers report a positive and
statistically significant average price reaction over the
announcement window.

Tests of the various hypotheses

seeking to explain this market reaction have been less
definitive.

To date, analysis of the demerger hypotheses

has consisted primarily of disaggregation of the data by
various criteria and the subsequent application of the
event study method to each categorization.

The stock price

reaction for each category is then compared to that of the
aggregate sample and to each of an alternative grouping.
This approach has provided evidence with respect to
some of the explanations for the observed stock price
reaction advanced in the literature.

Unfortunately, in

most cases, it has not been applied as a test of a
refutable hypothesis.

(A notable exception is the tests of

the bondholder expropriation hypothesis.

This hypothesis

has been rejected both by Hite and Owers,

(1983) and

Schipper and Smith,

(1983).)

Consequently, there exists no

satisfactory explanation for the market reaction to the
announcement of a spinoff.

In the following section a new

hypothesis is offered regarding the positive market
reaction associated with spinoffs.

This hypothesis is

subsequently tested in the framework of a rigorous model.
34
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3.1. Rational Expectations and the Stock Market
A spinoff divides a company into two entities,
typically separating two business units of a corporation
into stand-alone firms.

The operations and management of

each business unit generally remain unchanged after the
divestiture.

Separation of the operating units of the

parent and subsidiary seems to be the only real change
effected by a demerger.

Absent resolution of dyssynergies

between the two operating units, why should this
restructuring of a corporation's equity create economic
value?

It is possible that a spinoff is a value-neutral

event, and that the observed stock price response is a
reflection of market sentiment at the time of the
announcement.
The finance literature is replete with contradictions
of the rational expectations hypothesis:

that investors'

subjective probability distributions regarding stock
returns are equivalent to the realized distribution.
Specifically, it does not appear that the behavior of
market participants is motivated by strict application of
Bayes' Rule, which should dictate investors' reaction to
new information in an informationally efficient market.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that investors display a
consistent tendency to overreact to new information,
placing an inordinate emphasis on the most recent data for
decision making purposes.

Rather than evaluate each incoming piece of
information as a small part of a much greater whole, it
appears that investors become euphoric or despondent over a
firm's (or the market's) prospects when unusually good or
bad news is disclosed.

For example, in two related papers,

Debondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) examine the performance of
portfolios comprised of "winners" and "losers" - stocks
with either extreme capital gains or extreme losses
(respectively) over periods up to five years.

Debondt and

Thaler report a statistically significant difference in the
market-adjusted performance (calculated as an equally
weighted arithmetic average rate of return) of the two
portfolios for a 36 month period after portfolio formation.
These results have been replicated by other researchers.
(For example, see Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter,

(1992).)

The work of Robert Shiller (1989) examining stock
market volatility has led researchers to question the
rationality of market reaction to now information, given
the relative stability of dividends over time.

The results

of this research that suggest that the market
disproportionately weights the most recent information is
perhaps the strongest evidence available that the financial
markets may not operate in a strictly rational fashion at
all times.

Other examples of the results of empirical

research refusing to conform to (existing) theory are the
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familiar and numerous stock market anomalies, such as the
small firm effect, the January effect, the P/E effect, etc.
Most financial economists accept the presence of
irrational economic agents in financial markets, but
disagree with the view that these individuals can influence
market prices.

The standard rebuttal to any irrationality

hypothesis is a survivorship argument wherein rational
agents, by virtue of appropriate behavior, accumulate all
wealth and eliminate irrational agents (and their effect on
prices) from the market.

However, as pointed out by Arrow

(1982), there exist at least two problems with the
survivorship argument.
First, in financial markets, not all arbitrage
possibilities are exploitable.

Second, if most agents are

irrational, it is not at all clear that rational agents can
profit through arbitrage, at least in the short run.

For

patient arbitrageurs, discounting and the loss of liquidity
while holding arbitrage positions may serve to reduce any
profit associated with driving market prices to their
"correct" values.

Additionally, market frictions such as

transactions costs and the lack of availability of the full
proceeds of a short sale can reduce the attractiveness of
an arbitrage position.

Finally, although market

professionals are usually included in any list of rational
investors who might be expected to recognize and exploit
available arbitrage opportunities, it appears that even
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those who derive their livelihood from the stock market are
subject to biases in judgement (DeBondt and Thaler,
(1990)) .

3.2. Investor Psychology
Tverksy and Kahneman (1981) define a decision frame as
"the decision maker's conception of the acts, outcomes and
contingencies associated with a particular choice".

These

authors have demonstrated in series of experiments that the
evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produces
predictable shifts in preference when the same problem is
"framed" in different ways.

That is, the way a problem is

formulated can affect the choice preferred by decision
makers.

Tversky and Khahneman are able to effect reversals

of preference by experimental subjects in choices regarding
monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real.

Their

experiments show that perspective is important in the
decision-making process.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) also argue that people
rely on a limited number of heuristic principles to
simplify the task of assessing probabilities.

One of these

principles, availability, is the ease with which similar
situations can be brought to mind.

The authors suggest

that recent occurrences are likely to be relatively more
available (for recall) than earlier occurrences. However,
since availability is affected by factors other than
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frequency and probability, the reliance on availability
leads to predictable biases in the subjective assessment of
probabilities.

Specifically, occurrences that are more

available for recall tend to be judged more "likely" than
those that are less available.

The authors note that "it

is a common experience that the subjective probability of
traffic accidents rises temporarily when one sees a car
overturned by the side of the road."

3.3. The PRNI Hypothesis: Implications and Predictions
3.3.1.

Short-Term Effects

Drawing on the work of Tversky and Kahneman, it is
possible to formulate a new hypothesis regarding the market
reaction to contractual reorganization.

The stock price

reaction to the announcement of a spinoff may be the result
of investor optimism, induced (framed, to use Tversky and
Kahneman's terminology) by a prior period of market gains,
and may have little to do with the underlying economic
effects of the demerger.

This hypothesis - the positive

reaction to non-negative information hypothesis - could
also explain the stock price reaction to mergers, which,
like spinoffs, may be only a non-negative event inflated by
investors1 expectations.
In a similar vein, a recent paper by Lee, Shleifer and
Thaler (1991) demonstrates that the magnitude of the
discount on closed end mutual funds may be associated with

investor sentiment (whether investors are optimistic or
pessimistic).

Since the PRNI hypothesis implies that

investors' expectations are influenced by events of the
recent past, the rate of return of the market immediately
prior to the spinoff announcement may affect the associated
stock price reaction.

Specifically, if this hypothesis is

correct, one would expect to observe larger share price
reactions to spinoff announcements during periods of higher
market returns.

(Hereafter, for ease of exposition, market

returns will be categorized into "bull" and "bear"
periods.)
Note that the PRNI hypothesis does not necessarily
imply that spinoffs are a value-decreasing event.

It is

possible that the typical demerger enhances stockholder
wealth.

A positive stock price reaction may be an

appropriate response to the announcement of a spinoff, on
average.

However, if the stock price reaction to any given

announcement is entirely driven by the economic effects of
the spinoff, then there should be no association between
the market response to the announcement and the market
return in prior periods.
It may be that the reaction to events that are
difficult for investors to evaluate (e.g. economic
restructurings) are influenced by investor sentiment.

An

empirical investigation of the PRNI hypothesis is conducted
employing prior period market returns as a proxy for the

41

level of investor optimism about future prospects.

If

investor sentiment does in fact influence the market's
reaction to the announcement of a spinoff, the results of
this research should be robust with respect to choice of
proxy for market sentiment.

(Assuming, of course, that all

proxies chosen are indeed representative of investors'
beliefs about the prospects of the stock market.)
Therefore, the PRNI hypothesis is tested using several
sentiment indices.

3.3.2. Long-Term Effects
The intended effect of a corporate spinoff (to judge
from the explanations offered by management(s) at the time
of the announcement) is to enhance shareholder wealth by
legally and operationally separating two entities that are
more valuable apart than together.

If improvements in

operating performance or other benefits from spinoffs are
realized, on average, the long-term return performance of a
firm undertaking a spinoff may be improved.

More

generally, the return performance of a portfolio of firms
measured post-spinoff may exceed that of a portfolio of
those same firms measured pre-spinoff.
On the other hand, the PRNI hypothesis implies that
the post-spinoff return performance of a portfolio of
spinoff firms will not exceed, and indeed, may be less
than, the return performance of a portfolio of those same

firms pre-spinoff.

If the stock price reaction to the

announcement of a spinoff is primarily a reflection of
investor sentiment at the time of the announcement, then a
spinoff should have no positive effect on long-term return
performance.

Note that it is also possible that a

restructuring in the form of a spinoff does have a positive
effect on return performance on average, but that this
effect is recognized and impounded in price on the
announcement day(s).

In order examine the long-term

effects of a corporate spinoff, pre and post-spinoff
portfolios of demerging firms are created and analyzed.
Data, method and results of a study examining the short
term effects of spinoffs are described in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4:

SHORT TERM EFFECTS AND TESTS

4.1. Data and Method
4.1.1. Data
To create the sample of voluntary spinoffs, stock
distributions coded as tax-free spinoffs are identified
from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP)
Master daily file.

A search of the Dow Jones News

Retrieval database text is undertaken to identify
additional spinoff announcements.

Next, a search of ^he

Wall Street Journal (WSJ) Index and Moody's Dividend Record
is conducted to confirm the nature of the stock
distribution and identify the announcement date.

Finally,

the WSJ article announcing the impending spinoff is
examined for evidence of contaminating announcements.
Spinoffs that are considered to be involuntary or taxable
distributions are eliminated from the data.
The initial search results in a sample of 156
voluntary spinoffs, occurring between January 1970 and
December 1990.

Of the total sample of 156 announcements of

voluntary spinoffs, 24 are considered to be contaminated
because of non-spinoff related information in the
announcing WSJ article.

Thus, the final sample consists of

132 "clean" voluntary spinoff announcements.

Tables 4.1

and 4.2 provide the frequency of distribution of voluntary
spinoff announcements by year and month, respectively.
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TABLE 4.1
DISTRIBUTION OF SPINOFF ANNOUNCEMENTS BY YEAR
Year
1972
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

Number of Spinoff
Announcements
2
4
2
4
4
6
6
10
8

Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Total

Number of Spinoff
Announcements
8
10
13
14
19
9
20
6
11
156

TABLE 4.2
DISTRIBUTION OF SPINOFF ANNOUNCEMENTS BY MONTH
Month
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun

Number of Spinoff
Announcements
17
10
8
9
15
19

Month
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Total

Number of Spinoff
Announcements
17
9
9
16
10
17
156

The number of spinoffs announced during the decade of the
1980's (117) appears to have increased dramatically over
the number announced during the 1970's (28).

The increase

in the number of spinoffs from the 1970's to the 1980's is
consistent with results reported in prior research.

However, the magnitude of the difference between decades in
this sample may be amplified by data source limitations.1
No clear trend is apparent in the distribution of
spinoff announcements by month.

However, it does appear

that the greatest number of spinoffs are announced during
the beginning, end and middle of the calendar year.

This

probably reflects the popularity of the calendar year as
fiscal year and the tendency of board of directors'
meetings, shareholders9 meetings and other corporate
business to follow a calendar year schedule.2
Summary statistics for the size (of capitalization) of
the parent and subsidiary firms, as well as relative size
are presented in Table 4.3.

Size is calculated by

multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the market
price, both of which are obtained from the CRSP daily file.
For parent firms, the market price and number of shares
outstanding used in the computation are those prevailing on

JData from the Dow Jones Newswire is available only
from June 1979 forward. Therefore, the disproportionate
number of spinoffs announced during the last 12 years of
the sample period may be partially attributable to
selection bias.
2The relatively high number of spinoffs during the
month of January (17) suggests that there may be a "January
effect" for the share price reaction to the announcement of
a spinoff; that is, it is possible that demergers announced
during particular months exhibit systematically larger
share price reactions than those announced in other months.
However, disaggregation of the data by month of
announcement reveal no statistically significant
differences between demerger announcements in different
months.

46

the day the spinoff is announced.

For subsidiary firms,

the data are gathered on the first day trading data are
available.

Relative size is the ratio of the market value

of equity of the subsidiary over the market value of the
equity of the parent.

TABLE 4.3
SUMMARY SIZE STATISTICS FOR TOTAL SAMPLE
(Parent and Subs in 000*s, Relative Statistics in %)
____________ N
MEAN
MEDIAN
MINIMUM
MAXIMUM
Parent
156 $988,855
258,296
1,252
14,691,094
Subsidiary

144

197,741

53,886

530

2,767,856

Relative
Size

144

25.16

16.39

1.76

96.68

As might be anticipated, firms that spin off a
business segment tend to be large, on average (mean market
value = $989 million).

The portion of the equity spun off

during the restructuring averages 25% for this sample.

In

some cases, the parent is smaller than the subsidiary after
the spinoff.

This peculiar outcome results when the

smaller segment retains the original name and corporate
charter.

As reported by Hite and Owers (1983) and Miles

and Rosenfeld (1983), the size of the subsidiary relative
to the parent appears to be positively correlated with the
magnitude of the market reaction to the announcement of a
spinoff.

For this sample, the Pearson product moment

correlation coefficient between the two variables is .175
with a p-value of .0624.
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4.1.2. Method
To test the PRNI hypothesis, it is necessary to
establish a working definition of bull and bear markets.
One simple delineation, suggested by Fabozzi and Francis
(1977), is to categorize all months with a positive return
for the value-weighted CRSP index as bull markets and all
those with a negative return as bear markets.

Following

Fabozzi and Francis, this categorization will be designated
Up/Down Markets.
Since it is likely that some spinoff announcements
occur at the beginning of the month, before any period of
market gains, the Up/Down Markets definition is modified to
include multiple month periods of gains and losses,
respectively.

Two and three month periods are examined,

with spinoffs announced during the preceding month(s) of
each period deemed to have been announced in a "normal"
period.3
Another definition of bull/bear markets proposed by
Fabozzi and Francis is Substantial Up and Down (SUD)
Months.

The SUD Months definition separates the sample

period into three subsets:

months when the market moves up

substantially, months when the market moves down

Requiring returns to be of a consistent sign for
longer than three months reduced the sample size and the
number of degrees of freedom dramatically. Therefore only
bull/bear periods of a maximum of three months were
examined for the Up/Down markets scenario.
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substantially, and months when the market does not move
substantially.

The definition of a month in which

"substantial" move takes place is one for which the
absolute value of the market return is larger than half of
one standard deviation of the market return measured over
the entire sample period (IR^I > 0.5am) .

Naturally, bull

(bear) months are those for which the foregoing inequality
is true, and the sign of the market return is positive
(negative).

Months during which no substantial move takes

place are categorized as normal months.

Requiring

persistence over periods longer than two months results in
the loss of most of the sample observations.

Again,

announcements occurring during the first month of the two
month analysis fall into the normal categorization.
Finally, a third method of defining bull/bear markets
is to chose a longer time frame than those described above,
and require that the sign of the monthly market return be
primarily, but not exclusively positive or negative.

The

252 month period from 1970-1990 is divided into six month
segments.

Bull (bear) markets are defined as six month

intervals during which at least four months exhibit a
positive (negative) market return.

Again, normal months

are those that do not fall into either the bull or bear
category.

This definition is referred to hereafter as Six

Month Periods.

Table 4.4 presents the number of bull, bear
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and normal months for the each of the market definitions of
investor sentiment.

TABLE 4.4
NUMBER OF MONTHS FOR MARKET INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES
Bull
142
90
51

Persistence
1 month
2 months
3 months

Persistence
1 month
2 months

U p /Down Markets
Bear
Normal
110
0
50
112
25
176

Total
252
252
252

Substantial Up and Down Months
Bull
Bear
Normal
114
75
63
86
39
127

Persistence
4 of 6 months
with same sign

Bull
78

Six Month Periods
Bear
Normal
30
144

Total
252
252

Total
252

Given the decision-making heuristics and biases that the
PRNI hypothesis is predicated upon, it seems that the
recent past performance of the stock market itself may be
the best proxy for investor expectations about future
market performance.

However, an investigation of the

robustness of the PRNI hypothesis to varying specifications
of investor "optimism" and "pessimism" may be illuminating
with respect to the generality of the hypothesis.

In this

spirit, the hypothesis is examined in the context of four
additional proxies for investor sentiment.
proposed measures of investor sentiment are:

The four

50

1) the University of Michigan's Institute for Social
Research's consumer confidence survey,
2) the ABC News/Money magazine consumer comfort index,
3) the monthly percentage change in the Bureau of Economic
Analysis's Index of Leading Indicators,
4) the percentage of investment advisory services that are
"bullish".
Descriptions of these four data series follow.
The first non-market investor sentiment proxies to be
described are the two indices of consumer confidence:

the

University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research's
consumer confidence survey (CCS) and the ABC News/Money
magazine consumer comfort index (CCI).

Although the

indices each attempt to measure and quantify the
expectations of consumers and thus predict their future
behavior, survey frequency as well as the number of
questions asked differ between the two polls.
The CCS is a monthly telephone survey of US consumers
chosen at random.

The survey consists of five questions:

two regarding the individual's personal finances (short
term and long-term), two concerning the economic outlook
for the nation (short-term and long-term), and one
pertaining to the likelihood of a purchase of consumer
durables within the year.

The CCI is also a telephone

survey of randomly chosen individuals, but is conducted on
a weekly, rather than a monthly basis.

The CCI consists of

only three questions regarding the same three areas of
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concern:

personal finances, outlook for the aggregate

economy, and near-term purchasing conditions.
Each organization analyzes the information gathered in
its survey and condenses the data into a single number.
This number is intended to characterize the relevant time
period with respect to the confidence of consumers.
Relatively higher numbers indicate that consumers plan to
increase purchases over the near term, and relatively lower
numbers indicate the converse.

The time series of this

data may be evaluated to detect trends in consumer
confidence, and to gauge whether consumers plan to make
more or fewer purchases during the upcoming months than
those immediately past.
The University of Michigan's index has been compiled
on a quarterly basis since 1945, but on a monthly basis
only since January, 1978.

Therefore, monthly figures from

this index are available for only the last 156 of the 252
month sample period.

To include the entire sample period

in the analysis, quarterly data are converted to monthly
data by using each quarterly figure as the index value for
each of the three months comprising the quarter.

The ABC

News/Money magazine index is a weekly number that is a
monthly moving average, so that the figure reported for the
last week of the month is the average for the month.

This

monthly average is the figure used to represent investor
sentiment.

The CCI has been compiled since the end of
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1985; therefore only 61 months of the total sample period
are available for analysis.
To test the PRNI hypothesis, it is important to
segregate the data into bull months, bear months, and
normal months.

Since the data are reported as (or can be

translated into) individual monthly numbers, an obvious
method for grouping months into the three aforementioned
categories is to partition the data by guartile.

That is,

months for which the value of the index appears in the top
guartile of all index values observed during the sample
period are deemed to be bull months.

Similarly, months for

which the value of the index appears in the bottom quartile
of all index values observed during the sample period are
called bear months.

All remaining months (those that fall

into the two middle quartiles) are normal months.

As

before, the PRNI hypothesis may then be tested by comparing
the average prediction errors from the market model on the
day(s) on which a spinoff is announced across the three
(bull, bear, and normal) categories.
Another potential proxy for investor sentiment is the
level of aggregate economic activity.

That is, it may be

that investors gauge the prospects of the stock market by
evaluating certain macroeconomic variables.

Since it is

likely that investor's beliefs about the prospects of the
stock market are influenced by the level of future economic
activity (as opposed to current economic activity), the
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index of leading indicators seems a reasonable candidate
for a measure of investor sentiment.

The eleven-component

index of leading indicators is one of three business cycle
indices (leading, lagging and coincident indicators)
compiled and published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
in the monthly Survey of Current Business.
Naturally, the components of the index of leading
indicators are economic variables presumed to be positively
correlated with future aggregate economic activity.
Examples of these components include consumer goods
manufacturers' new orders for materials, the number of new
building permits issued for residential housing, and the
money supply (M2).

Importantly for this analysis, the

index of leading indicators also includes the return on the
S&P 500 stock index, and the monthly results of the
University of Michigan's consumer confidence survey.4
Implications of this overlap in proxies for investor
sentiment are discussed later.
The index of leading indicators is reported as a
monthly figure that is a weighted average of the eleven
component indices.

Since changes in the index over time

(rather than its absolute value) may be likely to influence
investor confidence, the percentage change in the index
from one month to the next is used as the proxy for
4The consumer confidence survey information became a
component of the index of leading indicators in January,
1989.
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investor sentiment.

That is, months during which a

relatively large increase in the index of leading
indicators is observed are deemed to be bull months.
Similarly, months during which a relatively large decrease
in the index of leading indicators is observed are deemed
to be bear months.

Months for which there is relatively

little change in the index of leading indicators from the
previous month are normal months.

Procedurally, this

segregation is again effected by partitioning the data into
quartiles, with the upper quartile labeled bull, the lower
quartile labeled bear, and the two middle quartiles normal.
The fourth non-market proxy for investor sentiment
proposed is the number of professional advisory services
that are optimistic or bullish with regard to the prospects
of the stock market.

This proxy is reported as a

percentage of the total number of advisory services
surveyed on a monthly basis.

That is, the number reported

for each month is the percentage of advisory services of
those surveyed that are predicting an upturn in the stock
market.

The data is compiled by Investor's Intelligence of

Larchmont, NY.

Collection of this data began in January

1974, so there exists information for 205 months of the 252
month sample period.
Again, months are separated into bull, bear, and
normal categories so as to examine the share price reaction
to the announcement of a spinoff in different types of
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markets.

The categorization into bull, bear and normal

months is effected by the segregation of the data into
quartiles as described above.

Naturally, months with the

greatest percentage of investor advisory service described
as bullish are bull months.

Months with the smallest

percentage of investment advisory services bullish are bear
months, and all other months are considered normal.

Table

4.5, Panels A and B present summary statistics and number
of bull, bear, and normal months for each of the non-market
investor sentiment proxies, respectively.
The data are categorized using the above definitions
of bull/bear markets, and the event study method (Patel1,
(1976)) applied to each subset.
used is as follows.

The event study method

The market model is

estimated over days -240 to -121 relative to the
announcement day:
Rjt — 3; + /JjRn,, + eit,

t

—240, ... ,—121

where
Rjt
Rtttt

=

return on equity of firm i on day t,
= CRSP value-weighted index of returns on the NYSE
and AMEX exchanges on day t,

a;,/?; = market model intercept and slope parameters
estimated by OLS regression,
eit

= residual return to stock i on day t.

The market model is used to compute prediction errors for
the period beginning 90 days before the event day and
ending 15 days after.
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TABLE 4.5
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR NON-MARKET
INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES

Panel A

Monthly
Quarterly

Monthly

University of Michigan Index (CCS)
Upper
N
Mean
Min
Max
Ouartile
156
83.1
51.7
101.0
93.9
252
81.6
54.4
99.5
91.8

Lower
Ouartile
71.7
72.5

ABC News/Monev Index (CCI)
Upper
Mean
Min
Max
Ouartile
-11.8 -■43.0
7.0
-7.0

Lower
Ouartile
-14.0

N
61

Monthly

Percent Change in Index of Leading Indicators
Upper
Lower
N
Mean
Min
Max
Ouartile Ouartile
252
3.9
32.0
42.8
10.6
-2.5

Monthly

Percentage of Investment Services Bullish
Upper
Lower
N
Mean
Min
Max
Ouartile Ouartile
204
43.0
16.0
80.0
50.0
35.0
NUMBER OF MONTHS FOR NON-MARKET
INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES

Panel B

Monthly Data
Quarterly Data

University of Michigan Index
Bull
Bear
Normal
39
38
79
64
61
127

Total
156
252

ABC News/Monev Index
Bull
Bear
Normal
18
18
25

Total
61

Monthly

Data

Monthly

Percent Change in Index of Leading Indicators
Bull
Bear
Normal
Total
Data
63
64
125
252

Monthly

Percentage of Investment Services Bullish
Bull
Bear
Normal
Total
Data
46
46
112
204

Prediction errors (u,,) for days -90 through +15 (the
event period) are computed as follows:
Ujt

= rit — (a, + /JjRmt) , t= —90/... /+15.

Average prediction errors and cumulative average prediction
errors, respectively, are given by:
Nt

PEt= E

U it

i=l

Nt
and
L

CPE, = E

PEt

L = -90,...,+15

t=-90

where
Nt = the number of firms in the sample.

T statistics are computed as:
ti

t S PEt]

T =

t=tn______________

[ (t, - t0 + 1) (p)]1/2,
where
t0= first day in interval,
t,= last day in interval,
-121

S [PEt p =

1

-121

119

t=-240__________

{

E PEt }]2

t=-240______

118
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Consistent with the PRNI hypothesis, if investors'
decisions are influenced by their optimism or pessimism (as
measured by the above-described proxies), the stock price
reaction to a spinoff announced in a bull market should be
larger than the reaction to a spinoff announced during a
bear market.

Additionally, the stock price reaction to a

spinoff announced in a bull (bear) market should be larger
(smaller) than the reaction to a spinoff announced during a
normal market.
The null and alternative hypotheses are as follows.
H0:

the stock price reaction to the announcement of a

spinoff during a bull market is not significantly different
from the market reaction to the same announcement made
during a bear or normal market.

Hj:

the stock price

reaction to the announcement of a spinoff during a bull
market is significantly different than the market reaction
to the same announcement made during a bear or normal
market.

Note that for all definitions of bull/bear markets

a joint hypothesis is tested.

Failure to reject the null

hypothesis results if:
1) investor sentiment is unrelated to the stock price
reaction to a corporate spinoff, or
2) the categorizations into bull/bear markets is an
inappropriate proxy for investor sentiment.
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The test whether a significant difference exists between
bull, bear and normal announcements is Student's t-test for
the difference in means between two independent samples.
The t value for the difference in means test is computed
as:

t

=
v(s2t/ni

---+ s22/n2)

where
Xj = mean of group i,
n; = number of observations in group i,
and
S 2;

=

S (Xj - x)2
n - 1

The announcement day (day 0) is defined as the first
mention of an impending spinoff in the WSJ.

The event

window includes day -1, since there is usually a one day
lag between an announcement and its publication in the WSJ.

4.2. Tests of PRNI Hypothesis Using Market Proxies for
Investor Sentiment
Table 4.6 presents results for the two day event
window (-1 to 0) and the 89 day pre-announcement period.
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TABLE 4.6
PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD AND EVENT WINDOW
AVERAGE PREDICTION ERRORS (APE)
Full Sample
Event
Period (Davs)
-1 to 0
-90 to -2

N
156
156

APE
0.0267
0.0399

T-Stat
13.10**
3.59**

Percent
Positive
67
56

T-Stat
12.15**
2.97**

Percent
Positive
68
56

Clean Sample
Event
Period (Davs)
-1 to 0
-90 to -2

N
132
132

APE
0.0267
0.0369

** Significant at the .01 level.
Over the two day event window, the average prediction error
for the clean sample is 2.67% and is statistically
significant at the .01 level.5

The clean sample includes

only observations not contaminated by the contemporaneous
announcement of non-spinoff related information.

During

the 89 day period prior to the spinoff announcement, the
sample exhibits a statistically significant upward price
drift.

5Results over Two Day
#
Hite & Owers
Schipper & Smith
Miles & Rosenfeld *

Event Window (-1 to
Obs
APE
123
0.033
93
0.028
55
0.033

T-Stat
13.25
6.61
6.55

* Miles and Rosenfeld consider day 0 to be the day before
the announcement appears in the WSJ so these results are
reported for day 0 to +1 in their article.
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4.2.1. Up/Down Markets Definition of Investor Sentiment
When the clean sample is categorized according to
whether the announcement occurred during a bull, bear or
normal month using the Up/Down Markets definition, positive
announcement effects are observed for all categorizations
over the two day event window (-1 to 0) .

These results are

summarized in Table 4.7.
Note that the APE for announcements made during months
when the market return is positive is substantially larger
than the APE associated with months during which the index
return is negative.

For the clean sample, Up market

prediction errors average between 4.04 and 5.51 percent;
prediction errors for announcements made during Down
markets average 0.32 to 1.14 percent.6 These differences
are statistically significant for all three categorizations
of the data.

Recall that for this definition of bull/bear

markets, the "normal" designation indicates a month at the
beginning of a two or three month bull or bear period that
is discarded in order to more clearly demarcate bull and
bear markets.

For the two and three month categorizations

(Panels B and C, respectively) the difference between
announcements occurring in bull and normal months is

6 Similar results were obtained with the marketadjusted returns model. The mean-adjusted returns model
was not used, because Klein and Rosenfeld (1987) argue this
technique tends to produce upward (downward) biased
abnormal returns when the event under investigation occurs
in a bull (bear) market.
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statistically significant; the difference between
announcements occurring in bear and normal months is not.
Assuming that investor sentiment is accurately represented
by the Up/Down Markets separation, the results support the
PRNI hypothesis.7

4.2.2. SUD Months Definition of Investor Sentiment
The results of the analysis based on the SUD Months
categorization of the data are reported in Table 4.8.
Differences between the stock price reactions for the SUD
disaggregations of the sample are smaller than those for
the Up/Down market categorization.

However, these

differences (approximately 4.1 percent for one month
persistence and 2.6 percent for two months) are of
considerable magnitude, given that the stock price reaction
to the typical spinoff averages 2.7 percent.
While the one month SUD disaggregation (Panel A) displays a
statistically significant difference between bull and bear
months, the null hypothesis of no difference between the
populations cannot be rejected for the two month definition
(Panel B).

7It is also possible that spinoffs which most enhance
shareholder wealth tend to be announced during periods of
rising market prices. However, results of an investigation
of the differential long-term shareholder wealth effects of
spinoffs announced in bull vs bear market do not support
this supposition.
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TABLE 4.7
UP/DOWN MARKETS
Bull = R..J > 0
Bear = Rn, < 0
1 Month Persistence

Panel A

Full Sample
Market
Bull
Bear

N
87
69
156

APE
.0400
.0098

T-Statistic for
Difference in Means
2.75** (Bull-Bear)

T-Stat % Pos
12.52** 69
5.65** 65
Clean Sample

Bull
Bear

71
61
132

.0404
.0105

11.41**
5.55**

2.47*

70
66

(Bull-Bear)

2 Months Persistence

Panel B

Full Sample
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal

N
56
31
69
156

APE
.0474
.0002
.0218

T-Statistic for
T-Stat % Pos Difference in Means
12.28** 66
3.02** (Bull-Bear)
1.91f (Bull-Normal)
1.75f
58
7.46** 73
-1.56
(Bear-Normal)
Clean Sample

Bull
Bear
Normal

46
27
59
132

.0508
.0032
.0185

12.22**
2.05*
5.99**

70
59
71

2.73** (Bull-Bear)
2.20* (Bull-Normal)
-1.02
(Bear-Normal)

3 Months Persistence

Panel C

Full Sample
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal

N
35
14
107
156

APE
.0579
.0060
.0192

T-Statistic for
T-Stat % Pos Difference in Means
10.56** 69
2.48*
(Bull-Bear)
1.56
64
2.46* (Bull-Normal)
9.21** 67
-0.79
(Bear-Normal)
Clean Sample

Bull
Bear
Normal

31
12
89
132
** Significant
* Significant
f Significant

.0551
.0114
.0188

9.98**
1.82f
8.23**

at the .01 level
at the .05 level
at the .10 level

68
67
69

1.97*
(Bull-Bear)
2.11* (Bull-Normal)
-0.43
(Bear-Normal)
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TABLE 4.8
SUBSTANTIALLY UP AND DOWN MONTHS
Bull = |Rnj|>0. 5am
Bear = | |>0. 5crn
and Rm>0
and Rm<0
1 Month Persistence

Panel A

Full Sample
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal

N
72
42
42
156

APE
.0402
.0024
.0317

T-Stat
11.48**
3.09**
7.09**

% Pos
68

57
81

T-Statistic for
Difference in Means
2.64** (Bull-Bear)
0.63
(Bull-Normal)
-2.17* (Bear-Normal)

Clean Sample
Bull
Bear
Normal

61
36
35
132

.0413
.0020
.0309

10.79**
2.89**
6.52**

69
56
88

2.55*
(Bull-Bear)
0.72
(Bull-Normal)
-2.09* (Bear-Normal)

2 Months Persistence

Panel B

Full Sample
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal

N
63
16
77
156

APE
.0392
.0131
.0193

T-Stat
10.68**
2.93**
7.54**

% Pos
63
69
72

T-Statistic for
Difference in Means
1.08
(Bull-Bear)
1.55 (Bull-Normal)
■0.28 (Bear-Normal)

Clean Sample
Bull
Bear
Normal

53
13
66
132

.0398
.0085
.0197

** Significant at
* Significant at
f Significant at

9.89**
1.86f
7.39**

64
69
73

1.20
(Bull-Bear)
1.41 (Bull-Normal)
■0.47 (Bear-Normal)

the .01 level.
the .05 level,
the .10 level.

A bull market is a
which the market return
of the market return is
deviation of the market
period.
A bear market is a
which the market return
of the market return is
deviation of the market
period.

one or two month period during
is positive, and the absolute value
greater than one-half the standard
return over the entire sample
one or two month period during
is negative, and the absolute value
greater than one-half the standard
return over the entire sample
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Interestingly, for the one month categorization of the
data, the difference between bull and normal month APE's is
statistically insignificant, while the difference between
bear and normal months APE's is significant at the .05
level.

4.2.3. Six Month Periods Definition of Investor Sentiment
Results for the Six Month Periods bull/bear
categorization are presented in Table 4.9.

These results

are also consistent with the PRNI hypothesis; the
difference between the APE's of the bull and bear
subsamples is 4.7 %.

The magnitude of this difference is

second only to that of the two month Up/Down Markets
categorization and is statistically significant at the .05
level.8 In summary, results of the analysis of market
oriented proxies for investor sentiment appear to be
consistent with the PRNI hypothesis.

That is, the stock

price reaction to announcements made during months when
investors are optimistic are larger, on average, than those
made during months when investors are expected to be
pessimistic.

8The market crash of October 1987 did not have a
significant effect on these results; only one spinoff
announcement during this month appears in the sample.
Removing this observation from the sample has no effect.
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TABLE 4.9
SIX MONTH PERIODS
Full Sample
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal

N
44
18
94
156

APE
.0566
.0023
.0176

T-Stat
13.12**
1.58
6.64**

% Pos
80
61
68

T-Statistic for
Difference in Means
2.69** (Bull-Bear)
1.82f (Bull-Normal)
-0.76
(Bear-Normal)

Clean Sample
Bull
Bear
Normal

39
16
77
132

0529
0059
0185

11.95**
1.79f
6.58**

79
63
71

2.17*
(Bull-Bear)
1.67f (Bull-Normal)
■0.56 (Bear-Normal)

** Significant at the .01 level.
* Significant at the .05 level,
f Significant at the .10 level.
This categorization defines a bull market as a six month
period during which the market return is positive for at
least four of the six months. A bear market is a six month
period during which at least four months display negative
market returns.
4.3. Tests of PRNI Hypothesis Using Non-Market Proxies
for Investor Sentiment
4.3.1. Consumer Confidence Indices
In order to examine the robustness of the PRNI
hypothesis to different specifications of investor optimism
and pessimism, alternative measures of investor sentiment
are used to categorize the data.

Results of the first non-

market proxy categorization (the University of Michigan's
consumer confidence survey) appear in Table 4.10. Recall
that monthly data for the CCS begins in January 1978, so
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spinoff announcements occurring prior to that date are
excluded from the monthly analysis.
No statistically significant difference exists for the
three possible pairings of between bull, bear and normal
markets for any categorization of the data using the CCS as
a proxy for investor sentiment.

Interestingly, for both

the monthly and quarterly data, bear market APE's are
larger than those for normal and bull markets.
The second non-market proxy for investor sentiment
used to test the PRNI hypothesis is the ABC News/Money
magazine

consumer comfort index.

Since the CCI began in

December 1985, only spinoff announcements that occurred
during the last 61 months of the 252 month sample period
are included in this analysis.

Table 4.11 presents event

study results obtained from a categorization of the spinoff
data using the level of the CCI as a proxy for bull, bear
and normal markets.

Again, there exist no statistically

significant differences between the APE's for bull, bear
and normal categorizations of the data.

For this investor

sentiment proxy, however, the average prediction errors
from the subset of firms that announced during normal
months display the largest average prediction errors.
While the results obtained from the two indices of consumer
confidence (or comfort) seem to be evidence against the
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TABLE 4.10
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN'S
MONTHLY INDEX OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE
Full Sample
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal

N
48
26
66
140

APE
.0236
.0354
.0253

T-Stat
9.76**
6.33**
6.14**

T-Statistic for
% Pos Difference in Means
74
-0.72
(Bull-Bear)
70
-0.16 (Bull-Normal)
64
0.59 (Bear-Normal)

Clean Sample
Bull
Bear
Normal

44
21
57
122

.0246
.0417
.0222

9.73**
6.88**
4.30**

75
81
61

-1.01
0.20
0.61

(Bull-Bear)
(Bull-Normal)
(Bear-Normal)

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN'S
QUARTERLY INDEX OF CONSUMER CONFIDENCE
Full Sample
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal

N
65
36
55
156

APE
.0293
.0333
.0207

T-Statistic for
T-Stat % Pos Difference in Means
11.07** 66
-0.21
(Bull-Bear)
6.56** 67
0.60 (Bull-Normal)
5.36** 67
0.70 (Bear-Normal)
Clean Sample

Bull
Bear
Normal
**
*
t

54
28
50
132

.0268
.0391
.0195

9.61**
7.02**
4.50**

67
75
66

-0.58
(Bull-Bear)
0.60 (Bull-Normal)
0.03 (Bear-Normal)

Significant at the .01 level.
Significant at the .05 level,
Significant at the .10 level.

Values of the monthly and quarterly indices of consumer
confidence are subdivided into quartiles. Bull months are
those for which the value of the index appears in the upper
quartile of the distribution. Bear months are those for
which the value of the index appears in the lower quartile
of the distribution. All other months are considered
normal.
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TABLE 4.11
ABC NEWS/MONEY CONSUMER COMFORT INDEX
Full Sample
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal

N
26
17
22

APE
.0299
.0149
.0465

T-Stat
9.63**
2.81**
4.09**

T-Statistic for
% Pos Difference in Means
73
0.94
(Bull-Bear)
59
-0.74 (Bull-Normal)
67
-1.47 (Bear-Normal)

65
Clean Sample
Bull
Bear
Normal

21

16
17
54

0291
0135
0419

9.09**
2.54**
2.17**

71
56
65

0.88
-0.51
-1.13

(Bull-Bear)
(Bull-Normal)
(Bear-Normal)

** Significant at the .01 level.
Values of the monthly index of consumer comfort are
subdivided into quartiles. Bull months are those for which
the value of the index appears in the upper quartile of the
distribution. Bear months are those for which the value of
the index appears in the lower quartile of the
distribution. All other months are considered normal.

PRNI hypothesis at first glance, further consideration of
the nature of consumer confidence raises questions
regarding the validity of this measure as a proxy for
investor sentiment.
Given the complementary nature of the investment and
consumption decisions, it may be that periods during which
consumption is preferred are those for which the investment
climate is perceived to be poor.

Conversely, when

investment prospects are perceived to be good, consumers
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may prefer to defer purchases to future periods in order to
take advantage of superior (expected) returns.

Thus, it

may be that investor sentiment is inversely related to
consumer sentiment.

If consumer confidence (as a proxy for

planned purchases over the near term) is relatively high,
this may simply mean that investment prospects are
relatively poor.
Note that the above argument implicitly assumes that
consumer (or investor) income is fixed across periods.

If

income is changing from one period to the next, it is
possible for consumption and investment to be positively
correlated.

That is, if income is rising (falling), an

individual may increase (decrease) levels of both
consumption and investment.

Since the CCS and CCI include

survey information regarding prospective levels of income,
it is possible that consumer confidence may be an
appropriate proxy for investor sentiment.
If consumer sentiment is inversely related to
investment opportunities, one might expect the level of
consumer sentiment to be negatively correlated with proxies
or return to capital available.

In fact, the Pearson

correlation coefficient indicates that both the monthly and
quarterly CCS are negatively correlated with the return on
the value-weighted CRSP index.

Table 4.12 presents a

correlation matrix for the various proxies for investor
sentiment.

Both indices are also negatively correlated

71

with the monthly percent change in the index of leading
indicators.

This evidence suggests that consumer sentiment

may not be a perfect representation of investor sentiment.

4.3.2. Percent Change in Index of Leading Indicators
It may be that investor sentiment is influenced by
changes in macroeconomic variables; in the context of the
PRNI hypothesis, it is possible that large changes in the
index of leading indicators affect the stock price reaction
to the announcement of a spinoff.

That is, relatively

large increases (decreases) in the level of macroeconomic
variables that are believed to lead the overall economy may
cause investor optimism (pessimism).

The separation of the

spinoff data using the percent change in the index of
leading indicators criterion is presented in Table 4.13.
For the clean sample, the difference between the
average prediction errors in bull and bear markets is 2.6
percent.

This difference is statistically significant at

the 10 percent level.

Differences between the APE's for

both bull and bear vs normal markets are not statistically
significant.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, two of

the components of the index of leading indicators are the
return on the S&P 500 and the monthly results of the
University of Michigan's consumer confidence survey.

TABLE 4.12
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES
Percent Change
in Index of
Leading Indicators

Percentage of
Investment
Services Bullish

Monthly
CCI

Quarterly
CCS

Monthly
CCS

-.0013
(.9920)

-.2167
(.0005)

-.1204
(.1294)

Return on Value
Weighted CRSP Index

.1588
(.0128)

.1064
(.1299)

Monthly CCS **

-.1671
(.0417)

.4662

.8756

.9808

(.0001 )

(.0001 )

(.0001 )

-.1353
(.0322)

.4085

.8916

(.0001 )

(.0001 )

Monthly CCI f

.1434
(.3250)

.2583
(.0444)

Percentage of
Investment
Services Bullish

.0234
(.1092)

Quarterly CCS

* P-Values in parentheses
** University of Michigan’s Consumer Confidence Survey
t ABC News/Money Consumer Comfort Index

72

73

TABLE 4.13
PERCENT CHANGE IN INDEX OF LEADING INDICATORS
Full Sample
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal

N
47
71
38
156

APE
.0402
.0221
.0134

T-Stat
7.53**
7.68**
4.28**

% Pos
70
64
65

T-Statistic for
Difference in Means
(Bull-Bear)
1.45
0.98 (Bull-Normal)
0.76 (Bear-Normal)

Clean Sample
Bull
Bear
Normal

39
64
29
132

.0481
.0221
.0101

8.47**
7.68**
4.08**

70
64
68

1.94| (Bull-Bear)
1.50
(Bull-Normal)
(Bear-Normal)
0.78

** Significant at the .01 level,
f Significant at the .10 level.
Monthly percentage change in the index of leading
indicators is subdivided into quartiles. Bull months are
those for which the percentage change of the value of the
index appears in the upper quartile of the distribution.
Bear months are those for which the percentage change of
the value of the index appears in the lower quartile of the
distribution. All other months are deemed normal.

The results presented in Table 4.13 are consistent
with those obtained by market proxies for investor
sentiment, but inconsistent with results obtained for
consumer confidence proxies for investor sentiment.

From

these relationships, one might suspect that changes in the
index of leading indicators are more strongly correlated
with the return of the stock market than the results of
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consumer confidence surveys.

In fact, the percent change

in the index of leading indicators is positively and
significantly correlated with the contemporaneous market
return; it is also negatively and significantly correlated
with the quarterly CCS.

(See Table 4.12)

The negative correlation between consumer confidence
and percent change in the index of leading indicators can
be interpreted as evidence in support of the argument that
consumer confidence (indices) and the value of investment
opportunities are inversely related.

Unfortunately, since

the percent change in the index of leading indicators seems
to closely follow the stock market, it is difficult to
construe this index as a "different" proxy for investor
sentiment.

4.3.3. Percentage of Investment Advisory Services Bullish
Results obtained using the percentage of investment
advisory services that are bullish as a proxy for investor
sentiment are presented in Table 4.14.
The categorization of spinoff announcements according
to type of market prevailing when the announcement takes
place reveals no statistically significant differences
between categorizations.

Interestingly, the percentage of

investment services that are bullish is positively and
significantly correlated with the indices of consumer
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confidence, but not with the contemporaneous market return
or the percent change in the index of leading indicators.
Therefore, it is possible that the results reported in
Table 4.14 would be consistent with those obtained using
the indices of consumer confidence as proxy for investor
sentiment.

In fact, this is the case.

TABLE 4.14
PERCENTAGE OF INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICES BULLISH
Full Sample
Market
Bull
Bear
Normal

N
36
38
80
154

APE
,0302
,0309
,0239

T-Statistic for
T-Stat % Pos Difference in Means
-0.04 (Bull-Bear)
11.62** 78
0.53 (Bull-Normal)
6.61** 63
0.42 (Bear-Norma1)
5.66** 65
Clean Sample

Bull
Bear
Normal

30
32
65
127

.0275
.0403
.0207

10.40**
7.68**
4.41**

77
69
65

-0.68
0.52
1.06

(Bull-Bear)

** Significant at the .01 level.
Monthly data for the percentage of investor services that
are bullish are subdivided into quartiles. Bull months are
those for which the percentage of services that are bullish
appears in the upper quartile of the distribution. Bear
months are those for which the percentage of services that
are bullish appears in the lower quartile of the
distribution. All other months are deemed normal.
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4.4. Integrated Tests
It appears that the PRNI hypothesis cannot be rejected
when a "market" proxy (or one closely correlated with the
market) is used to represent investor sentiment.

Results

of tests of the PRNI hypothesis using non-market proxies do
not support the hypothesis.

In order to test the

hypothesis using all previously employed proxies for
investor sentiment, an ANOVA model is formulated and
tested.

Consider the model
Yijk = U + P, + Mj + P*Mk + eijk

where
Y is the cumulative (over the two day event window)
prediction error;
U is the main effect;
P is the proxy of investor sentiment

i = Up/Down Markets,
i = SUD Months,
i = Six Month
Periods
i = Percent Change
in Index of
Leading
Indicators
i = CCS,
i = CCI,
i = Percentage of
Advisory
Services
Bullish;

M is the type of market

j = bull,
j = bear,
j = normal;

P*M is the interaction of proxy and market effects and the
eijk are random errors with zero mean and equal variances.
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The Up/Down Markets and SUD Months sentiment proxies
have more than one bull/bear market definition.

The

following definitions are used in this integrated analysis:
for Up/Down markets, three months of persistence, and SUD
Months, two months of persistence.

For the University of

Michigan's CCS, quarterly data are used since observations
are available for the entire sample period (in contrast to
the monthly data).

Again, the PRNI hypothesis is tested.

In the ANOVA framework, the null hypothesis is that M, the
type of market, has no statistically significant effect on
the cumulative prediction errors (Yijk) .

Naturally, the

alternative hypothesis is that prediction errors observed
across the three different types of markets are
significantly different from one another.
The ANOVA model is fitted to all 841 clean
observations.

Results are presented in Table 4.15.

TABLE 4.15
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ALL INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES
Degrees of
Source
Freedom
Proxy
6
Market
2
Proxy*Market 12
Model
20
Error
820
Total
840
R2 = 0.03076
Grand Mean = 0.02701

Sums of
Squares
0.000166
0.064284
0.070748
0.135198
4.260561
4.395759

Mean
Square

0.006759
0.005279

F-Value

Pr>F

0.01

1.0000

6.09
1.12
1.28

0.0024
0.3425
0.1833

The choice of proxy for investor sentiment has no effect on
the size of the market model prediction errors, since the
same data are evaluated using each market proxy.

In

contrast, the type of market prevailing on the day the
spinoff is announced has an effect on the cumulative
prediction error that is statistically significant at the
.01 level.

Consistent with the PRNI hypothesis, the

average prediction error for announcements occurring during
a bull market is larger than those associated with
announcements during normal or bear months (.0397 vs .0206
and .0224, respectively).

Tukey's studentized range test,

a Bonferroni t test, and Scheffe's test all indicate that
the difference between the stock price reaction in bull
months and that in bear and normal months is statistically
significant at the .10 level.

There is no statistically

significant interaction effect.
The above analysis investigates market and proxy
effects on the cumulative prediction errors by using all
proxies for investor sentiment developed in this study.

By

separating the investor sentiment proxies into two groups market and non-market proxies - it is possible to draw a
clear distinction between the market (bull, bear, normal)
effects when using market vs non-market proxies.

The

"market" proxies are the Up/Down Markets, SUD Months and
Six Month period definitions of investor sentiment.
percent change in the index of leading indicators is

The

included in this group, since this proxy seems to be
correlated with the other three.

The group of non-market

proxies includes the two consumer confidence indices, and
the percentage of investor advisory services bullish.
Separate ANOVA models are fitted to the data for each of
the two groups of market proxies.

Results of these

analyses are in Tables 4.16 and 4.17.

TABLE 4.16
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR MARKET
INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES
Degrees of
Freedom
Source
Proxy
3
Market
2
Proxy*Market 6
Model
11
Error
516
Total
527

Sums of
Sauares
0.000012
0.108422
0.004867
0.113302
2.655785
2.769086

Mean
Sauare

0.001030
0.005279

F-Value
0.00
10.27
0.15
1.95

Pr>F
1.0000

0.0024
0.9883
0.0313

R2 = 0.04092
Grand Mean = 0.02689

TABLE 4.17
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR NON-MARKET
INVESTOR SENTIMENT PROXIES
Degrees of
Freedom
Source
Proxy
2
Market
2
Proxy*Market 4
Model
8
Error
304
Total
312
R2 = 0.01345
Grand Mean = 0.02721

Sums of
Sauares
0.000135
0.006028
0.015714
0.021877
1.604776
1.626653

Mean
Sauare

0.002735
0.005279

F-Value
0.01
0.57
0.74
0.52

Pr>F
0.9873
0.5656
0.5625
0.8427

From the above tables, it is evident that when market
effects are analyzed according to the type of investor
sentiment proxy used to segregate the data, only market
proxies are associated with statistically significant
differences in stock price reaction across types of
markets.

For the non-market proxies, market effects (along

with proxy and interaction effects) are not statistically
significant.

For the models in Tables 4.16 and 4.17,

Tukey's studentized range test, the Bonferroni t test, and
Scheffe's test indicate statistically significant
differences across market types with market proxies, and
insignificant differences with non-market proxies.
The results of these integrated tests support the
marginal t tests reported earlier:

use of market-oriented

investor sentiment proxies result in failure to reject the
PRNI hypothesis, while analyses using non-market proxies
lead to rejection of the hypothesis.9 There exist two
possible explanations for this set of circumstances.
Either the market proxies are representative of investor
sentiment and the non-market proxies are not, or neither
group of proxies characterizes investor sentiment and the
market proxies are capturing some entirely different
phenomenon (or phenomena).
Marginal analyses are also conducted using a
nonparametric test (Corrado, 1989) and an event study
method that corrects for event-induced variance (Boehmer,
et.al., 1991). The results of these analyses are similar
to those reported above.

Finally, it should be pointed out that a statistically
significant positive announcement effect is observed even
during periods categorized as "bear" for all proxies of
investor sentiment investigated.

For one non-market proxy

(the CCS), bear month APEs are larger than those of bull
and normal months.

For market proxies of investor

sentiment (Up/Down Markets, SUD Months and Six Month
Periods) the bear period announcement day APEs are much
smaller than those observed during bull periods, but
positive, nonetheless.

If investor sentiment is symmetric

and periods of low market returns induce pessimism, then
these returns are smaller than those that might be expected
based on strictly on the economic effects of the
restructuring.

Therefore, it appears that though investor

sentiment may play a role in the positive stock price
reaction to the announcement of a spinoff, it cannot be the
sole explanation for the observed response.

CHAPTER 5:

PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS

5.1. Data and Method
5.1.1. Portfolio Analysis Sample
The data used in the analysis of the long-term effects
on shareholder wealth are a subset of that used in the
event study analysis.

More information is required to

create and analyze the performance of spinoff portfolios;
observations are

"lost"whenever information onthe

subsidiary firm,for example, is

unavailable.

Specifically, for this analysis of the long-term or
portfolio effects of corporate spinoffs it is required
that:
1) the spun off subsidiary be traded on either the New York
or American exchanges, or on NASDAQ, and
2) at least three years (720 days) of trading data be
available for both the parent and subsidiary following
the ex-date, (and prior to the ex-date as well, but the
latter constraint was not violated by any firm in the
sample)
3) the ex-date be reported.1
Of the total sample of 156 firms, the spun off
subsidiaries of 144 are traded on one of the three above
listed exchanges.

Table 5.1 presents the number of parent

and spun off firms that trade on each exchange.
remaining 12 are

The

either offshore subsidiaries of a US

’For several firms in the event study sample, no ex-date is
reported in Moody’s Dividend Record. A statement such as MNo exdividend date has been set by the NYSE" appeared where the ex
date is typically reported. These firms are deleted from the
portfolio analysis sample.

83

parent that do not trade on a US exchange, firms that are
listed on a regional exchange, or firms that changed names
during the spinoff process and remain undetected by this
investigation.

For 54 of the 144 firms for which price

information is available, either:
1) one or both of the parent and subsidiary firms listed
for less than the requisite three years,
2) or the ex-date was not reported.
Accordingly, the final sample for portfolio analysis
consists of 90 firms.

Summary statistics for the size of

the parent and subsidiary firms, as well as relative size
are presented in Table 5.2.

TABLE 5.1
SPINOFF FIRMS BY EXCHANGE LISTING
Parent
71
39
46
156

NYSE
ASE
OTC

Subsidiary
41
21
82
144

TABLE 5.2
SUMMARY SIZE STATISTICS FOR PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS
(Parent & Subsidiaries in 000's, Relative Statistics in %)
__________ N
Parent
90
Subs

90

Relative 90
Size

MEAN_________MEDIAN
$1,218,341
290,854
227,836
24.71

MINIMUM
1,252

MAXIMUM
14,691,094

59,675

2,305

2,767,856

16.38

1.76

96.68
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Both the parents and subsidiary firms are larger for the
subset of companies for which sufficient information is
available for the portfolio analysis.

This result is not

surprising, since more information tends to be available
for larger firms.

Relative size, however, remains

essentially unchanged (24.71% vs 25.16%).

5.1.2. Portfolio Analysis Method
Although the short-term announcement effects of
corporate spinoffs have been examined in some detail, the
long-term effects on shareholder wealth of this form of
corporate restructuring are left unexplored.

As noted

earlier, Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1991)

(CMW)

investigate the post-spinoff performance of a portfolio of
spun off subsidiaries and find that this portfolio has
returns that are superior to those of a market portfolio or
one composed of a sample of matched firms.
However, CMW investigate only the post ex-dividend
date (day on which the parent and subsidiary begin trading
as separate entities) performance of the spun off firms
ignoring the performance of the parent company.

Parent

firms are typically much larger than spun off subsidiaries;
the performance of the former is more important than that
of the latter in determining overall efficiency accruing to
the investor.

Therefore, the post-event performance of
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both the parent and subsidiary firms are investigated in
the following analysis.
Another issue that has thus far not been addressed in
the finance literature is the relative risk-adjusted
performance of demerged firms before and after the event of
the spinoff.

A useful technique for examining the general

performance of groups of firms is to create portfolios
consisting of the firms under investigation, and then
evaluate the performance of the portfolio.
case, two portfolios are created:

In the demerger

one comprising the pre

spinoff parent firms, and another composed of the post
spinoff parent and subsidiary firms.

The relative risk-

adjusted performance of these two portfolios has
implications for the general success of corporate spinoffs
as a shareholder wealth-enhancing strategy.
If it is found that the post-spinoff portfolio has a
risk-adjusted return superior to that of the pre-spinoff
portfolio, then this may be interpreted as evidence
supporting the idea that spinoffs increase shareholder
wealth, on average.

Similarly, if the risk-adjusted

performance of the two portfolios is not significantly
different, then on average, shareholder wealth has been
enhanced (by the amount of the increase in share price on
the announcement day).

On the other hand, if the post

spinoff portfolio underperforms the pre-spinoff portfolio
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on a risk-adjusted basis, the generally accepted view that
demergers increase shareholder wealth can be questioned.
In order to compare the risk-adjusted return of the
pre and post-spinoff portfolios (Before and After
portfolios, respectively), the sample of firms that have
announced and subsequently undertaken a divestiture of a
business segment via spinoff is created, as described in
Section 5.1.1.
As reported above, the final sample consists of 90
firms.

The pre-spinoff evaluation period begins three

years (72 0 trading days) prior to each firm's ex-date and
ends the day before the ex-date.

The 90 days immediately

prior to the announcement of the spinoff and the two-day
event window are excluded from the analysis so as to
abstract from the share price effects directly associated
with the spinoff announcement.

The post-spinoff evaluation

period begins on the ex-date and ends three years after
this date for parent firms.

For subsidiary firms, the

evaluation period begins on the first day the stock begins
trading and ends 720 trading days later.2 Naturally, the
After portfolio is twice as large as the Before portfolio
(180 vs 90 firms).

Generally, the first trading day is within two weeks
of the ex-date. For firms which trade on a when-issued
basis, stock price data is gathered from Standard & Poors
Daily Stock Price Records.
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Three different measures of portfolio performance are
used to achieve a broad assessment of the risk/return
characteristics of the two portfolios.

Perhaps the most

appropriate measures of portfolio performance for the
purposes of this analysis are those that consider
systematic risk as the true estimate of risk.

Since it is

unlikely that any investor would retain all of his wealth
in a portfolio consisting exclusively of spinoff firms,
non-diversifiable risk should be a more valid gauge than
total risk.
The Treynor measure of portfolio performance examines
"excess" return (above that of the risk-free asset) when /3
is the risk measure.

The Treynor measure appears as:
(Rp - Rf)//3P

where
M

Rt =

2 rit,
t=i

M = number of days in evaluation period,
rit = return for security i on day t,
N

Rp =

S W; Rt
i=l

N = number of firms in portfolio,
W4 = proportion of firm i's equity value to the summed
equity value of all firms in portfolio,3

3The weight of each firm is the ratio of its average
equity value across the three year evaluation period to the
total average equity value for all firms in the portfolio.

Rf = return on the risk-free asset,
ft = CovXRuEml
<72(Rm)
R,,, = return on the market portfolio,
N

ft = 2 Wj ft.

i=l

Before and After portfolio excess returns and j8s are
calculated in the above described manner.4

In this

analysis daily stock returns from the CRSP Master daily
file are used.

The risk-free rate is proxied by the 30-day

Treasury-bill rate.

Excess return is annualized (excess

return over three year period/three) to provide a more
familiar measure of

return.

Since /3 estimates vary

depending on the market proxy chosen, three market indices
are used for the market return.

These three benchmark

portfolios are the value-weighted CRSP index, the equalweighted CRSP index, and the Standard & Poors 500 index.
Another measure of portfolio performance using j3 as
the measure of risk is the Jensen performance index.

This

measure is:
ftt

“

ftt

=

a p

+

ft(R m t

—

ftt)

+

e pt

4However, since this analysis is being conducted over
event rather than calendar time, the risk-free return (R^
is also a "portfolio", with the values of the monthly
Treasury bill rate being weighted by the portfolio weight
of the firm with which it is associated.
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Procedura1ly, weekly (five trading days) portfolio returns
are computed, then the contemporaneous risk-free rate of
return is subtracted to create the weekly excess return.
Excess returns so obtained are regressed against the weekly
market risk premium (market return less risk-free return)
using OLS.

Naturally, this means that for the three year

(720 trading days) evaluation period, the number of
observations used in the regression is 144 and that 48
observations are available for the yearly analyses.
If the portfolio under investigation earns more than
the "normal" (Jensen's term) risk premium for its level of
risk, the intercept term (a) will be significantly
positive.

Conversely, a will be negative for any portfolio

that earns a return less than that commensurate with its
systematic risk.

Portfolios earning a normal return for

the level of non-diversifiable risk borne will have a's not
significantly different from zero.
The use of this measure to assess portfolio
performance is problematic, of course, since Roll (1978)
demonstrates that rankings of portfolio performance can
vary with different benchmark portfolios.

However,

Peterson and Rice (1980) use the Jensen measure (as well as
the Sharpe and Treynor measures) to rank the performance of
fifteen mutual funds using four different benchmark
portfolios.

Examining the degree of correlation between

rankings and across benchmark portfolios, the authors

90

report that "little change in ranking occurred when the
market index was varied".
Therefore, although ambiguous evidence may result from
the use of the Jensen measure, it can be a meaningful
technique for assessing portfolio performance, especially
when combined with other portfolio performance evaluation
methods.

In this analysis three market proxies are used to

mitigate (and examine) the severity of the variable ranking
problem for this particular dataset.
Finally, the (excess) return to variability measure
first proposed by Sharpe (1966) is used to evaluate the
comparative performance of portfolios of spinoff firms
before and after the event.

The Sharpe measure is defined

as:
(Rp - Rf)/av
where
orp = the standard deviation of portfolio p.
This criterion defines total risk as the risk relevant to
holders of the portfolio when, in fact, systematic risk is
more likely to be germane, as discussed above.

However,

when combined with the results of the Treynor and Jensen
indices, the results of an analysis using the Sharpe index
provides additional information with respect to the riskreturn characteristics of the two portfolios to be
compared.
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Next, the performance of both the Before and After
portfolios is analyzed on a year by year basis.

This is in

order to ascertain patterns over time in the risk and
market-adjusted returns for each of the two portfolios.
The After portfolio is also decomposed into parent and
subsidiary portfolios, which are evaluated using the three
techniques described above.

This analysis provides

evidence regarding the source of After portfolio riskadjusted returns.
If the division of the firm into two entities has
little effect on the risk-return characteristics of the
spinoff firms in general, the differences in pre and post
spinoff portfolio performance will be small.

Therefore, it

will not be possible to draw a clear conclusion regarding
the long-term effectiveness of the spinoff decision.
In order to more clearly differentiate the two
portfolios, an empirical test is conducted to determine
whether or not there exists a statistically significant
difference between estimates of the parameters of the
market model for the combined (pre-spinoff) and separated
(post-spinoff) firms.

The Chow test is used to determine

whether changes in parameter estimates are statistically
significant.

The formulation of the Chow test is as

follows.
The market model appears as:
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R i, t a i + Pi^in, t

where
R;t= return on stock i at time t,
^

= return on market at time t

To test whether the estimates of the parameters of the
market model change for each firm after the spinoff, the
unrestricted model is estimated and appears as:

«i

R=

R 1

*2

2^

0

Pi

0

m2

«2

+U

P2

Note that the estimates for both the intercepts and slopes
may be different before and after spinoff in this
formulation.

An ordinary least squares regression produces

vectors /3 (slope vector) and e (residual vector) .

The j3

vector appears as:

P = (MM) _1MR

and e'e is the unrestricted residual sum of squares.
The null hypothesis of no difference between the parameters
estimates of the market model before and after the spinoff
appears as:

The restricted model is as follows

'*x

[?]+“

from this equation, the restricted residual sum of squares
e*'e* can be calculated.

Then, the S statistic is computed

usinq the formula:
(e;e.-6e)
S=-

ee
(n-k)

■~F,(q,n-Jc)

where
q = the number of restrictions,
k = number of parameters
n = nj + n2 = total number of observations.
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If the value of the test statistic exceeds the critical
value of the F statistic then the null hypothesis of no
change in the parameters of the market model post-spinoff
may be rejected.
For firms that display a statistically significant
difference in the parameter estimates of the market model
before and after the spinoff, the long-term shareholder
wealth effects of corporate spinoffs are investigated using
the Treynor, Jensen, and Sharpe measures.
Finally, portfolios are created using the timing of
the announcement of the spinoff as selection criterion.
That is, portfolios are created based on whether a firm
announced its spinoff during a bull or a bear market (using
the definitions of bull/bear markets used in the event
study analysis.)

Evaluation of the before spinoff/after

spinoff risk-adjusted performance of these portfolios is
conducted using the above-described techniques to ascertain
whether the timing of the demerger announcement affects the
long-term performance of spinoff firms in general.
The method described above conducts the portfolio
performance analysis over event time.

The portfolios thus

constructed are in some sense fictional, since this
technique presumes that each firm's ex-date is the same as
that of all other firms.

Although appropriate for

evaluating the long-term wealth effects of a corporate
event, this approach does not address the returns actually
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available to investors.

An alternative procedure is to

conduct the analysis over calendar, rather than event time.
The focus of this investigation is the risk-adjusted
returns available to investors who purchase the shares of
spinoff firms two years prior to the ex-date and hold these
shares for two years after the ex-date.

Therefore, firms

are added to the portfolio on the date 24 months prior (480
trading days) to their respective ex-dates and removed 24
months after their ex-date.
Rather than a comparison of pre and post-spinoff
portfolio performance, the calendar time analysis examines
the risk-adjusted returns actually available to investors
who hold portfolios of spinoff firms throughout the
demerger process.

Note that the pre-announcement period

and two-day event window returns are not excluded in this
analysis.

The calendar time portfolios consist of the 90

firms that are examined in the event time analysis.

The

firms are segregated into three portfolios, using the year
in which the parent firm went ex-dividend as the criterion
by which portfolios are constructed.
Accordingly, the first portfolio consists of firms for
which the ex-date occurred between January 1970 and
December 1980.

The second portfolio consists of firms for

which the ex-date occurred between January 1980 and
December 1985.

Firms for which the ex-date occurred

between January 1986 and December 1988 comprise the third
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portfolio.

Risk-return characteristics of these portfolios

are analyzed using the portfolio performance measurement
techniques described above.

The contribution of the

calendar time analysis is to examine risk-adjusted returns
that are actually available to investors from spinoff firms
that exist contemporaneously.

5.2. Portfolio Analysis Results
5.2.1. Performance of the Full Sample Portfolio
Evaluation of the performance of the Before and After
portfolios on a market and risk-adjusted basis yields the
results presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4.

The annualized

excess returns for the Before and After portfolios are
presented in Panel A of Table 5.3.

The After portfolio

displays an annualized excess return of approximately 14.7
percent, while the annualized return for the Before
portfolio is approximately 11.5 percent.

The difference

between the excess returns of these two portfolios is not
statistically significant at the .05 level.5
Recall that the evaluation period for the Before
portfolio does not include the ninety days prior to the
announcement of the spinoff or the two day announcement
window.

The After portfolio also has greater returns (or

smaller negative returns in the case of the equal-weighted
5A t-test of difference in means is conducted on the
daily portfolio excess return for the Before and After
portfolios. This t-statistic is 1.49.

CRSP index) than the Before portfolio on a market-adjusted
basis for all three of the proxies for market return.

TABLE 5.3
FULL SAMPLE THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE
Panel A

Annualized Excess and Market-Adjus ted Returns

Annualized Excess Return
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
S&P 500 Adjusted

Before
Portfolio
11.46
2.19
-4.53
7.14

After
Portfolio
14.69
6.35
-0.88
9.95

Panel B

Estimated Market Model Parameters

Benchmark
Valued-Weighted
CRSP Index

Parameter
a
0

Parameter Estimates
Before
After
0.0007
0.0001
1.025
1.082

Benchmark
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index

Parameter
a
0

Parameter Estimates
Before
After
-0.0002
-0.0001
1.093
1.125

Benchmark
Standard &
Poors 500

Parameter
a
0

Parameter Estimates
Before
After
0.0002
-0.0001
1.008
1.093
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TABLE 5.4
FULL SAMPLE THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE
Panel A

Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf) //3p
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf)/crp
Trevnor's Measure
Value
Equal
Benchmark
Weighted
Weighted
CRSP
CRSP
Before Portfolio
0.106
0.102
After Portfolio
0.143
0.134

S&P
500
0.114
0.134

Sharpe's
Measure
26.96
21.02

Panel B

Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance
(R p t

“

R f t)

=

“ p

+

/3 p (R m t

“

R f t)

+

e pt

Before Portfolio
Parameter Estimates
Equa1-We ighted
CRSP Index
-0.0890 (-1.36)

a

Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0309 (0.26)

P

1.394 (13.65**)

1.316 (11.05**)

S&P
500
0.0509 (2.21*)
1.358 (13.63**

After Portfolio

a

Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0743 (1.51)

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
-0.0496 (-0.96)

S&P
500
0.0964 (1.99*)

P

0.690 (6.23**)

0.596 (5.36**)

0.686 (6.48**)

** Significant at the .01 level
* Significant at the .05 level

Interestingly, both portfolios have positive market
adjusted returns when the S&P 500 and the CRSP valueweighted indices are used as the market proxy.

In

contrast, negative returns are observed for each portfolio
for the equal-weighted CRSP index.

This pattern of greater

returns for the CRSP equally-weighted index relative to the
other two indices is observed throughout the analysis of
portfolio performance.

One possible explanation for the

superior performance of the equally-weighted index is the
small firm effect; the S&P 500 consists primarily of large
capitalization firms and the value-weighted index,
naturally, is more heavily influenced by the performance of
larger firms.6 If small firms earn risk-adjusted returns
that are greater than those earned by large capitalization
firms, this would be reflected in higher returns for an
equally-weighted index than a value-weighted index
consisting of the same firms or an index comprised
primarily of large firms.
Examining risk-adjusted performance (Table 5.4, Panels
A and B), the After portfolio again outperforms the Before
portfolio.

Specifically, since Before and After average

portfolio j8s are almost the same,

(Before = 1.072, After =

1.070) values for the Treynor measure of portfolio
performance reflect the relationship between the annualized

6For a discussion of the small firm effect, see
Reinganum (1981) or Roll (1982).

excess returns of the two portfolios.

The After portfolio

is exactly twice as large as the Before portfolio so it
might be expected that the standard deviation of the former
is larger than that of the latter.

On the other hand, half

of the After portfolio is comprised of small firms (the
spun off firms) that yield returns that tend to be more
volatile than those of the larger firms that comprise the
Before portfolio.

In fact, the standard deviation of the

daily portfolio return over the three year evaluation
period of the Before portfolio is lower than that of its
After counterpart (.0043 vs .0069).

Therefore, the result

obtained using the Sharpe measure of portfolio performance
is not consistent with that obtained with Treynor's
measure; the Sharpe measure indicates superior performance
for the Before portfolio.

For this sample of spinoff

firms, the demerger has virtually no effect on systematic
risk, but increases the level of total risk of the
portfolio.
Finally, the Jensen measure of portfolio performance
(Table 5.4, Panel B), using three proxies for the market
return, indicates abnormal performance in the case of both
the Before and After portfolios when compared to the excess
return on the S&P 500 index.
parentheses.)

(T statistics are in

This abnormal performance is significantly

positive, but is not supported by results obtained using
the CRSP value and equally-weighted indices as market
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proxies.

Note that estimates of the /3 coefficient for

Jensen's measure seem unusually high for the Before
portfolio (average = 1.36), and unusually low for the After
portfolio (average = 0.66).

These results can be

attributed to the fact that the analysis is being conducted
over event, rather than calendar time.

5.2.2. Performance of Before Portfolio
An examination of the performance of the Before
portfolio on a yearly basis is presented in Tables 5.5 and
5.6.

The designation "one year prior" denotes the 240

trading day period immediately before the ex-date for each
firm in the spinoff portfolio.

(Excluding, of course, the

90 day pre-announcement period and the two day event
window.)

Similarly, "two years prior" represents the 240

day trading period between the 241st and 480th (inclusive)
trading days prior to the spinoff.

Finally, the "three

years prior" period is comprised of the 240 trading days
between the 481st and 720th trading days before the ex-date
for each demerger firm in the portfolio.
The decomposition of Before portfolio results over the
total evaluation period into each of the three component
years reveals relatively even performance for excess
returns.

Raw excess returns seem to be flat over the

periods two and three years before the spinoff, and then
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TABLE 5.5
FULL SAMPLE BEFORE THE EX-DATE
Panel A

Yearly Excess and Market-Adjusted Returns

Annualized Excess Return
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
S&P 500 Adjusted

1st Year
Prior
8.75
8.01

3.84
11.95

2nd Year
Prior
12.68
-2.75
-15.12
2.35

3rd Year
Prior
11.35
6.72
6.51
9.60

Panel B

Estimated Market Model Parameters

Benchmark
Valued-Weighted
CRSP Index

Benchmark
Equa1-Weighted
CRSP Index

Benchmark
Standard &
Poors 500

Parameter
0!
0

Parameter Estimates
3 Years
1 Year
2 Years
Prior
Prior
Prior
-0.0002
0.0004
-0.0002
1.138
1.125
0.925

Parameter
a
0

Parameter Estimates
1 Year
2 Years
3 Years
Prior
Prior
Prior
-0.0003
-0.0008
0.0003
1.179
1.272
1.020

Parameter
0!
0

Parameter Estimates
1 Year
2 Years
3 Years
Prior
Prior
Prior
0.0001
0.0001
0.0005
1.062
1.057
0.856
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TABLE 5.6
FULL SAMPLE BEFORE THE EX-DATE
Panel A

Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf)/@p
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /ap
Trevnor's Measure
Value
Equal
Weighted
Weighted
S&P
CRSP
CRSP
500
0.079
0.074
0.082
0.111
0.099
0.120
0.123
0.111
0.133

Benchmark
1 Year Prior
2 Years Prior
3 Years Prior

Sharpe's
Measure
18.08
29.35
32.33

Panel B

Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance
(R pt

“

R ft)

=

ap

$ p (R m t

~

R ft)

e pt

One Year Prior to Ex-Date
Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0665 (1.61)
1.421 (9.84**)

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0890 (1.36)
1.419

(8.36**)

S&P
500
0.0509 (1.89f)
1.390 (9.58**)

TWO Years Prior to .Ex-Date
Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
•0.1066 (-0.89)
1.675 (7.26**)

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
-0.2661 (-2.02*)
1.608 (5.89**)

S&P
500
0.0235 (0.463)
1.586 (7.12**)

Three Years Prior to Ex-Date

a

Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0778 (1.00)

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.1039 (1.19)

|3

0.990 (5.73**)

0.829 (4.18**)

** Significant at the .01 level
* Significant at the .05 level
f Significant at the .10 level

S&P
500
0.1210 (1.63)
0.982 (5.95**)
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decline slightly in the year immediately prior to the
spinoff.

However, on a market-adjusted basis, the Before

portfolio shows the best performance in the first year
prior to the spinoff, with market-adjusted return actually
negative for the second year prior to the spinoff for two
of the market proxies.

The relatively good market-adjusted

performance of the Before portfolio in the year immediately
prior to the spinoff may reflect information leakage before
the 90 day pre-announcement period for some firms in the
portfolio.
On a risk-adjusted basis (Table 5.6, Panel A),
Treynor1s measure indicates that the performance of the
Before portfolio is best in the third year prior to the
spinoff (average Treynor's index = .122) and worst in the
year immediately prior to the spinoff.

Similarly, Sharpe's

measure suggests that portfolio performance is best during
the third year prior to the spinoff.
For the Jensen measure, the results show that
performance during the first year prior to the spinoff is
significantly positive when compared to the S&P 500 index.
In contrast, performance during the second year prior to
the spinoff is significantly negative when measured against
the equally-weighted CRSP index.

In summary, it appears

that the risk-adjusted performance of the Before portfolio
is best during the third year before the spinoff and best
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on a market-adjusted basis during the year immediately
prior to the spinoff.

5.2.3. Performance of After Portfolio
An examination of the performance of the After
portfolio on a yearly basis is presented in Tables 5.7 and
5.8.

The period designated "first year after" represents

the 240 trading days immediately following the ex-dividend
date of each firm in the portfolio.

"Second year after"

and "third year after" periods consist of trading days 241480 and 481-720 relative to the ex-date, respectively.
Of the three years constituting the sample period, the
After portfolio displays the best performance during the
second year following the spinoff, on both a raw excess
return and market-adjusted return basis.

The above-market

returns reported for the After portfolio appear to be
concentrated in the second year following the spinoff, with
returns over the first and third years approximating those
of the market proxies.

These results are consistent with

those of Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1991), who report
that spun off subsidiaries show the strongest marketadjusted performance during the second year after the
spinoff.

These authors also report relatively poor

performance over the first year (primarily because of poor
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performance in the distribution month), but good
performance during the third year following the spinoff.7

TABLE 5.7
FULL SAMPLE AFTER THE EX-DATE
Panel A

Yearly Excess and Market-Adjusted Returns

Annualized Excess Return
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
S&P 500 Adjusted

1st Year
After
2.77
0.89
2.32
4.04

2nd Year
After
20.09
10.55
4.85
13.12

3rd Year
After
13.32
2.16
-5.66
3.05

Panel B

Estimated Market Model Parameters

Benchmark
Valued-We ighted
CRSP Index

Benchmark
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index

Benchmark
Standard &
Poors 500

Parameter
a
0

Parameter Estimates
1st Year
2nd Year 3rd Year
After
After
After
-0.0001
-0.0001
0.0005
1.096
1.084
0.855

Parameter
a
0

Parameter Estimates
1st Year
2nd Year 3rd Year
After
After
After
-0.0026
-0.0001
0.0001
1.200
1.221
0.976

Parameter
a
0

Parameter Estimates
1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year
After
After
After
0.0001
0.0001
0.0006
1.028
1.007
0.791

7Mean raw return for subsidiaries over the
distribution month for CMW's sample: -0.09%. Mean raw
return for subsidiaries over the distribution month for
this sample: -0.19%.
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TABLE 5.8
FULL SAMPLE AFTER THE EX-DATE
Panel A

Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf) //3p
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /<rp

Benchmark
1st Year After
2nd Year After
3rd Year After
Panel

b

Trevnor's Measure
Equal
Value
Weighted
S&P
Weighted
CRSP
500
CRSP
0.023
0.027
0.025
0.165
0.199
0.185
0.136
0.168
0.155

Sharpe':
Measure
4.44
25.93
19.33

Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance
(Rpt “ R ft) = 0!p + /3p(Rmt “ Rft) + ®pt

First Year After Ex-Date
Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0808 (0.83)

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0503 (1.43)

0.550 (3.00**)

0.552 (3.09**)

S&P
500
0.0953 (1.41)
0.561 (3.19**)

Second Year After Ex-Date
Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.1151 (1.74f)

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0704 (0.74)

S&P
500
0.1391 (1.95f)

0.822 (5.11**)

0.900 (5.29**)

0.785 (5.02**)

Third Year After Ex-Date
Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0303 (0.42)

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0128 (0.16)

S&P
500
-0.0539 (-0.76)

0.718 (5.64**)

0.543 (4.05**)

0.714 (5.88**)

** Significant at the .01 level
t Significant at the .10 level
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For this sample, spinoff portfolio returns over the third
year following the demerger outperform the value-weighted
CRSP and S&P 500 index market proxies, but not the equalweighted CRSP index.

(The Jensen measure indicates,

nevertheless, that these differences are not statistically
significant.)
Risk-adjusted returns over the second year following
the spinoff are also superior to those of the other two
years comprising the sample period.

The average Treynor

measure (across market proxies) is larger for the second
year (.183) than for either the first (.025) or third
(.153) years.

Similarly, the Sharpe measure of portfolio

performance is largest for the second year.

The Jensen

measure reveals that the only significantly positive a's
are observed during the second year following the spinoff
using the value-weighted CRSP and the S&P 500 indices as
market proxies.

In summary, the performance of the After

portfolio during the second year following the spinoff
appears to be superior to that of the market in general
(for the market proxies used here).

The performance of the

spinoff portfolio during the first and third years
following the demerger is not significantly different from
that of the market.
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5.2.4. After Portfolio by Parent and Subsidiary
The After portfolio is separated into two portfolios;
one comprised of parent firms and the other consisting of
subsidiary firms.

This decomposition allows analysis of

the relative contribution of parent and subsidiary firms to
overall portfolio performance.

Annualized excess returns

and market-adjusted returns are presented in Table 5.9.

TABLE 5.9
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY PORTFOLIOS
Three Years After Ex-Date
Panel A

Annualized Excess and Market-Adjusted Returns

Annualized Excess Return
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
S&P 500 Adjusted

Parent
Portfolio
15.27
6.93
-0.30
10.53

Subsidiary
Portfolio
11.31
2.97
-4.26
6.57

Panel B

Estimated Market Model Parameters

Benchmark
Valued-Weighted
CRSP Index

Parameter
a
0

Parameter Estimates
Parent
Subsidiarv
0.0001
0.0004
1.068
0.772

Benchmark
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index

Parameter
a
13

Parameter Estimates
Parent
Subsidiary
0.0001
0.0001
1.107
1.015

Benchmark
Standard &
Poors 500

Parameter
a
0

Parameter Estimates
Parent
Subsidiary
-0.0001
0.0001
1.106
1.016

110

TABLE 5.10
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY PORTFOLIOS
Panel A

Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf) //3p
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /ap
Trevnor's Measure
Value
Equal
S&P
Benchmark
Weighted Weighted
500
CRSP
CRSP
0.138
Parent Portfolio
0.143
0.153
0.111
Subsidiary Portfolio 0.147
0.111

Sharpe's
Measure
31.42
13.79

Panel B

Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance
(Rpt

”

Rft)

^p(Rmt

—

Rft)

®pt

Parent Portfolio

a

Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0140 (1.54)

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
-0.0011 (-1.38)

S&P
500
0.0173 (2.34*)

0

0.693 (6.28**)

0.599 (5.41**)

0.688 (6.52**)

Subsidiary Portfolio
Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
S&P
CRSP Index
500
-0.0154 (-0.30)
0.0212 (1.18)

0!

Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0012 (0.69)

&

0.797 (4.42**)

**
*

Significant at the .01 level
Significant at the .05 level

0.863 (4.66**)

0.716 (4.15**)

I ll

Table 5.10 contains risk-adjusted returns for the Parent
and Subsidiary portfolios.
Over the three year post-spinoff evaluation period,
the Parent portfolio outperforms the Subsidiary portfolio
on both a raw excess return and market-adjusted excess
return basis.

However, a comparison of the mean daily

excess portfolio returns does not indicate a statistically
significant difference between the return of the two
portfolios.

Surprisingly, systematic risk, as measured by

average portfolio /3 across market proxies, is lower for the
Subsidiary portfolio (0.93) than for the Parent portfolio
(1.09).

This result is unexpected since subsidiary firms

are typically much smaller than the parent firms, and thus
might have larger /8s.

The Subsidiary portfolio

estimate

for the value-weighted CRSP index (0.77) is considerably
lower than that for the other two indices (avg. = 1.02).
This result may indicate the inappropriateness of the
value-weighted CRSP index as a benchmark portfolio for a
sample of small firms.
The average Treynor measure for the Parent portfolio
is .144 and the corresponding average measure for the
Subsidiary portfolio is .123, indicating superior riskadjusted performance by the former, despite the lower /3 of
the latter.

It should be noted, however, that the

estimate computed using the value-weighted CRSP index
influences these results; the average Treynor measure for
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the Subsidiary portfolio using only the equal-weighted and
S&P 500 indices is .111.

Total risk as measured by

portfolio standard deviation is considerably higher for the
Subsidiary portfolio (.0082 vs .0048), and thus the Sharpe
measure indicates superior risk-adjusted performance by the
Parent portfolio.

Evaluating results from the Jensen

measure of portfolio performance, significant abnormal
performance is observed only for the Parent portfolio when
using the S&P 500 index.
These results for the Subsidiary portfolio are similar
to those reported by CMW for their sample of spun off
firms; however, the portfolio return for this sample is
somewhat smaller than the portfolio return described by
CMW.

These authors report an annualized three year return

of 27.4 percent, while the annualized three year return for
this sample of subsidiary (spun off) firms is 20.6
percent.8

Consequently, the market-adjusted annualized

return for this sample is also smaller than that reported
by CMW, and is not significantly greater than any of the
three market proxies used.
important, however.

Choice of market proxy is

Compared to the benchmark portfolio

used by CMW (the S&P 500), this sample of spun off firms
8The difference between the results obtained by CMW
and those for this sample may be partially explained by the
fact that CMW1s sample consists of 21 firms (of a total of
146) that are merged into another firm during the
evaluation period. The positive and statistically
significant abnormal returns accruing to merger targets may
influence the returns for CMW's sample portfolio.
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has positive market adjusted returns but compared to the
equal-weighted CRSP index, market adjusted returns are
negative.

Although CMW use the S&P 500 as their market

proxy, it is by no means clear that this index of
(relatively) large firms is an appropriate benchmark with
which to evaluate the performance of a portfolio of small
firms.
5.3. Portfolio Performance When a Post-Spinoff Change in
the Estimates of the Market Model Parameters is
Detected
In order to examine changes in the risk-return
characteristics of firms that have undertaken a spinoff, a
subset of the complete spinoff portfolio is created.

The

criterion for any given firm's inclusion in this new
portfolio is a statistically significant change in the
estimates of the parameters of the market model after the
demerger.

Of the full sample of 90 firms, for 34 it is

possible to reject the null hypothesis of no statistically
significant change in the parameters of the market model
after the spinoff.

This sample of 34 firms is designated

the "Reject" portfolio.

The Reject portfolio is expected

to be comprised of firms that have experienced the most
dramatic changes in risk-return characteristics, and thus a
comparison of Before and After portfolios may clarify
results observed in the full sample spinoff portfolio.

The

results obtained in an analysis of the risk-return
performance of a portfolio of firms for which there is a

114

significant change in the estimates of the parameters of
the market model after the event of the spinoff (the Reject
portfolio) are somewhat surprising.
It was expected that the results of this analysis
would amplify the changes observed in the risk-return
characteristics for the portfolio of all firms in the
sample.

TABLE 5.11
REJECT PORTFOLIO THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE
Panel A

Annualized Excess and Market-Adjus ted Returns

Annualized Excess Return
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
S&P 500 Adjusted

Before
Portfolio
8.73
1.18
-5.62
6.03

After
Portfolio
5.93
1.64
-9.94
1.86

Panel B

Estimated Market Model Parameters

Benchmark
Valued-Weighted
CRSP Index

Parameter
a
(3

Parameter Estimates
Before
After
0.0001
-0.0002
1.109
1.069

Benchmark
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index

Parameter
a
(3

Parameter Estimates
After
Before
-0.0002
-0.0001
1.126
1.104

Benchmark
Standard &
Poors 500

Parameter
a
/?

Parameter Estimates
Before
After
0.0003
0.0002
0.992
1.036
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TABLE 5.12
REJECT PORTFOLIO THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE
Risk-Adjusted Performance

Panel A

Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf)//3p
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /dp

Benchmark
Before Portfolio
After Portfolio

______ Treynor's Measure
Equal
Value
Weighted
Weighted
S&P
CRSP
CRSP
500
0.084
0. 079
0.078
0.054
0.060
0.055

Sharpe's
Measure
10.25
5.59

Panel B

Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance
(R p t

”

R ft)

=

a P

+

p (^ m t

”

R ft)

e pt

Before Portfolio

a

Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
CRSP Index
0.0846 (0.48)
-0.0874 (-0.46)

S&P
500
0.1314 (0.77)

fi

0.863 (5.24**)

0.861 (5.61**)

0.744 (4.08**)

After Portfolio

a

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
CRSP Index
0.0719 (0.62)
-0.0313 (-0.26)

S&P
500
0.1039 (0.91)

0

0.654 (5.71**)

0.636 (5.72**)

0.604 (5.33**)

** Significant at the .01 level
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That is, since the risk-return characteristics of each
firm in the Reject portfolio have been altered more than
those of the average firm in the larger (full sample)
portfolio, it seems likely that analysis of the smaller
portfolio would reveal risk-return changes in the same
direction, but of greater magnitude than those observed for
the full sample.
Recall that the After portfolio outperforms the Before
portfolio on both a market and risk-adjusted basis when the
full sample is considered.

However, for the sample of

firms for which the null hypothesis of no significant
change in the parameters of the market model can be
rejected, the Before portfolio outperforms the After
portfolio on both a market and risk-adjusted basis.
difference is not statistically significant.)

(The

Explanations

for the observed results differing from those expected
include the possibility that firms most affected by the
event of the spinoff are affected in a negative (at least
in a risk-return sense) manner, while the general effect of
the demerger is more benign and less pronounced.

Why the

effect is not more uniform across firms, of course, is the
obvious question prompted by this scenario.
As reported above, the Before portfolio displays
larger raw excess and market-adjusted returns than the
After portfolio for this sample of firms.

Systematic risk,

as measured by /?, declines slightly for the Reject
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portfolio after the event of the spinoff (average Before =
1.09 vs average After = 1.06).

However, this decline in 0

is insufficient to induce superior risk-adjusted
performance in the After portfolio as evaluated using the
Treynor measure criterion.

The fact the 0s for the Before

and After portfolios are so similar is surprising, since
this is a sample of firms that exhibits significantly
different market model parameter estimates before and after
the demerger.

On the other hand, the difference between

Before and After 0s is larger for this portfolio is larger
than that for the full sample (for which the Before and
After 0s are virtually identical) .
Total risk, as measured by portfolio standard
deviation, is also similar for the Before and After
portfolios, with the result that the Sharpe criterion
indicates superior performance by the Before portfolio.
Examination of the results of an analysis conducted using
Jensen's measure reveals no significantly abnormal
performance by either the Before or After portfolios.

5.4. Bull and Bear Market Portfolios
Since it appears that the short-term share price
effect associated with the announcement of a corporate
spinoff is influenced by prior period market returns, a
natural extension of the event study analysis is to examine
whether the timing of the announcement affects long-term

118

share price performance.

The long-term performance of

demerger firms that make the spinoff announcement in bull
markets versus the long-term performance of firms that
announce the spinoff during bear markets is conducted using
the same method used to analyze the relative long-term
performance of previously discussed portfolios.
The particular definition of bull and bear markets
used to create the portfolios is the "Six Month Periods"
delineation.

Recall that this categorization defines a

bull (bear) market as a six month period during which the
market return is positive (negative) for at least four of
the six months prior to the announcement.

Since the Six

Months Periods definition of bull/bear markets provides
large differentials between bull and bear market APE's in
the event study analysis, it is believed to be a good
candidate to examine differences in long-term performance
associated with timing of the announcement.

Use of this

definition of bull/bear markets results in small portfolio
sizes, however; the bull portfolio consists of 26 firms,
and the bear portfolio 11.

Performance of portfolios

created using the bull/bear market announcement criteria is
presented in Tables 5.13-5.14.
Excess returns for both the Before and After
portfolios created using the Bull market announcement
criterion are lower than their full sample counterparts.
This result is surprising, since it might be expected that
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excess returns for a portfolio of stocks evaluated during a
period of relatively high market returns would be superior
to those of a portfolio of stocks chosen at random (with
respect to contemporaneous market return).

TABLE 5.13
BULL MARKET PORTFOLIO THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE
Panel A

Annualized Excess and Market-Adjusted Returns

Annualized Excess Return
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
S&P 500 Adjusted

Before
Portfolio
9.98
2.55
-2.30
7.54

After
Portfolio
13.22
1.55
-7.30
5.35

Panel B

Estimated Market Model Parameters
Benchmark
Valued-Weighted
CRSP Index

Parameter
a
0

Benchmark
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index

Parameter
a
i8

Benchmark
Standard &
Poors 500

Parameter
a
0

Parameter Estimates
Before
After
0.0002
0.0003
1.026
0.961
Parameter Estimates
Before
After
0.00003
0.0001
1.149
1.119
Parameter Estimates
Before
After
0.0004
0.0005
0.951
0.880
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TABLE 5.14
BULL MARKET PORTFOLIO THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE
Panel A

Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf)//3p
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /ap

Benchmark
Before Portfolio
After Portfolio

Trevnor1s Measure
Value
Equal
Weighted
S&P
Weighted
CRSP
500
CRSP
0.087
0.105
0. 097
0.118
0.150
0. 138

Sharpe's
Measure
12.50
15.72

Panel B

Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance
(Rpt - Rft) = aP + 0P(Rmt “ Rft) + ept

Before Portfolio

a

Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
CRSP Index
0.0093 (0.24)
-0.0651 (-0.37)

S&P
500
0.0969 (1.54)

13

1.157 (5.86**)

1.060 (5.62**)

1.086 (5.97**)

After Portfolio

a

Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
CRSP Index
-0.0016 (-1.30)
0.0415 (0.59)

P

0.968 (7.33**)

0.917 (6.11**)

** Significant at the .01 level

S&P
500
0.0817 (1.19)
0.926 (7.50**)
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Recall that the Six Month Periods bull market definition
concerns the six month period prior to the announcement
date, and that this analysis evaluates the portfolios over
the three year period prior to and after each firm's ex
date.

Therefore, it is not clear that the evaluation

period for the bull market portfolio should be a period of
relatively high market returns.
While excess returns are larger for the After bull
market portfolio, the Before portfolio returns are higher
on a market-adjusted basis for two of the three market
proxies.

Consistent with results obtained for the Reject

portfolios, systematic risk as measured by portfolio 0
declines from the Before portfolio (avg.= 1.04) to the
After portfolio (avg. = .99).

As a result, the After

portfolio displays superior risk-adjusted returns for each
of the benchmark portfolios using the Treynor criterion.
Total risk as measured by portfolio standard deviation
increases for these firms as a result of the spinoff (.0079
vs .0088).

(Note that the small sample size of the bull

market portfolio increases portfolio standard deviation
over that of the full sample.)

Nonetheless, results of an

analysis using the Sharpe measure are consistent with those
obtained using the Treynor measure; superior performance by
the After portfolio.

Portfolio performance as measured by

Jensen's criterion is not significantly different from that
of the three market proxies.

In contrast to the results
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obtained for the bull market portfolio, the period of
evaluation for the bear market Before portfolio appears to
be truly "bear", with the annualized excess return on the
Before portfolio the smallest observed for any portfolio
(6.27%).

TABLE 5.15
BEAR MARKET PORTFOLIO THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE
Panel A

Annualized Excess and Market-Adjusted Returns

Annualized Excess Return
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
Equal-Weighed CRSP Adjusted
S&P 500 Adjusted

Before
Portfolio
6.27
2.93
-2.90
7.44

After
Portfolio
21.00
1.51
-6.31
6.27

Panel B

Estimated Market Model Parameters

Benchmark
Valued-Weighted
CRSP Index

Parameter
a
0

Benchmark
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index

Parameter
a.

Benchmark
Standard &
Poors 500

(3

Parameter
a
0

Parameter Estimates
Before
After
0.0002
0.0002
1.089
0.974
Parameter Estimates
Before
After
-0.00002
-0.0001
1.195
1.079
Parameter Estimates
Before
After
0.0003
0.0003
1.008
0.902
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TABLE 5.16
BEAR MARKET PORTFOLIO THREE YEARS BEFORE/AFTER THE EX-DATE
Panel A

Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf)/fip
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf) /op
Trevnor's Measure_____
Value
Equal
Weighted
S&P
Weighted
CRSP
500
CRSP
0.062
0.058
0.053
0.233
0.215
0.195

Benchmark
Before Portfolio
After Portfolio

Sharpe's
Measure
4.60
17.56

Panel B

Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance
(^ p t “

^ ft)

t

0 p (^ m t

_

^ ft)

®pt

Before Portfolio

a

Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.2420 (1.09)

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
-0.2999 (-0.11)

S&P
500
0.2931 (1.31)

0

1.077 (6.23**)

1.094 (4.90**)

0.996 (6.17**

After Portfolio

a

Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0076 (0.11)

0

1.216

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
-0.0972 (-0.72)

(8.59**)

1.099

** Significant at the .01 level

(7.90**)

S&P
500
0.0525 (0.96)
1.156

(8.41**
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This result cannot be attributed to unusually poor
performance by the Before portfolio, since market adjusted
returns are comparable to those observed for portfolios
throughout this analysis.

The After portfolio, on the

other hand, has relatively large excess returns (21.0%,
which is significantly different from the excess return
earned by the Before portfolio at the .05 level) and rather
typical market adjusted returns, indicating a higher level
of market return during the post-spinoff evaluation period.
Average portfolio /3 declines slightly (by .101) as
does portfolio standard deviation (.014 vs .012) after the
spinoff.

These results, combined with the superior excess

return performance of the After portfolio, suggest superior
risk-adjusted performance by the After portfolio.

Again,

the Jensen measure reveals no significantly abnormal
performance.
Based on the above results, it does not appear that
the type of market in which a spinoff is announced has a
pronounced effect on the long-term shareholder wealth
effects of the demerger.

That is, although differences in

excess returns for the Before and After portfolios for the
bear announcements are greater than those observed for any
Before/After pair in this analysis, when the portfolio
returns are adjusted for contemporaneous market return,
these differences become very small.
i

Similarly, market

adjusted returns for both bull and bear announcements (for
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Before and After portfolios) are comparable to those of
portfolios constructed without regard to the level of
investor sentiment proxies in the month of announcement.9

5.5. Calendar Time Portfolios
The performance of portfolios grouped by the year of
the ex-date over calendar time is presented in Tables 5.17
and 5.18.

Recall that the evaluation period for firms

comprising these portfolios is a four year span; two years
(480 trading days) prior to the ex-date of the spinoff, and
two years after.

Parent firms are added to the portfolio

at the beginning of this four year period, and deleted from
the portfolio at the end of the period.

Subsidiary firms

are added to the portfolio when trading in the security
begins, and deleted two years after the ex-date.

In

contrast to the technique used to analyze the relative
performance of the Before and After portfolios, returns
observed over the 90 day pre-announcement period and two
day event window are included in the analysis.
The data are separated into three calendar time
portfolios using the year of the ex-date as the criterion
of portfolio selection.

Dates selected as boundaries for

each of the calendar time portfolios are chosen so as to

9Results of analyses of portfolios created using other
bull/bear market definitions indicate no clear relationship
between the timing of the announcement and portfolio
performance.
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balance the number of firms in each portfolio.

Since

relatively fewer spinoffs occur during the decade of the
1970's, firms with ex-dates during the 11 year period
between January 1970 and December 1980 (inclusive) were
included in the first portfolio (n=36).
The number of spinoffs increased during the 19801s, so
the eight year period between January 1981 and December
1988 is divided into two segments.

The second calendar

time portfolio consists of 31 firms that went ex-dividend
between January 1981 and December 1985, and the third
portfolio is comprised of 23 firms that have an ex-dividend
date between January 1986 and December 1988.

Naturally,

firms that have ex-dates after 1988 are not included in the
third portfolio since sufficient price data is not
available for these firms.

The raw excess annualized

returns for the calendar time portfolios are larger than
those observed for the event time portfolios discussed
above (average excess annualized return = 18.99%).

This

result is not surprising, since the former contain the
(statistically significant) positive returns that are
associated with the 90 day pre-spinoff announcement period
and two day event window, while the latter do not.
The impressive performance of the calendar time
portfolios is particularly evident in the market-adjusted
returns, where the return of these portfolios is (slightly)
less than that of the market for only the 1981-1985
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portfolio using the equal-weighted CRSP index as market
proxy.

For all other portfolios and market proxies, the

portfolio return is higher than that of the market.

TABLE 5.17
CALENDAR TIME PORTFOLIOS
Panel A

Annualized Excess and Market-Adjusted Returns

Annualized Excess Return
Value-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
Equal-Weighted CRSP Adjusted
S&P 500 Adjusted

1970-1980
Portfolio
Return
17.74
11.20

8.72
19.63

1981-1985
Portfolio
Return
22.24
13.44
-0.95
21.17

1986-1988
Portfolio
Return
17.50
9.57
11.03
13.08

Panel B

Estimated Market Model Parameters
1970-1980 Portfolio

a

P

Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
CRSP Index
0.0004
-0.0001
0.976
1.105

S&P 500
Index
0.0005
0.927

1981-1985 Portfolio

a

P

Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
CRSP Index
0.0003
-0.0001
0.902
1.087

S&P 500
Index
0.0005
0.825

1986-1988 Portfolio

a

P

Parameter Estimates
Value-Weighted
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
CRSP Index
0.0002
0.0001
0.918
1.037

S&P 500
Index
0.0003
0.825
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TABLE 5.18
CALENDAR TIME PORTFOLIOS
Panel A

Risk-Adjusted Performance
Treynor's Measure = (Rp-Rf)//3p
Sharpe's Measure = (Rp-Rf)/ap
Treynor's Measure
Value
Equal
S&P
Weighted Weighted
Benchmark
CRSP
CRSP
500
0.161
0.191
1970-1980 Portfolio
0.182
0.269
0. 205
1981-1985 Portfolio
0.247
0.212
0.169
0.191
1986-1988 Portfolio

Sharpe's
Measure
21.79
42.33

46.15

Panel B

Jensen's Measure of Portfolio Performance
(R p t

“

R ft)

=

aP +

/3 P (R m t

“

R ft)

+

e pt

1970-1980 Portfolio

a

Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0143 (2.37*)

0

1.125 (13.68**)

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0388 (0.62)

S&P
500
0.0192 (3.19**

0.955 (12.71**)

1.107 (13.43**

1981-1985 Portfolio

a

Value-We ighted
CRSP Index
0.0076 (1.27)

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0057 (0.87)

S&P
500
0.0118 (2.02*)

&

0.912 (9.98**)

0.805 (8.21**)

0.716 (10.16**)

1986-1988 Portfolio

a

Value-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0118 (0.73)
1.065 (11.35**)

Parameter Estimates
Equal-Weighted
CRSP Index
0.0012 (0.73)
1.107 (10.63**)

S&P
500
0.0253 (1.66f)
0.984 (11.16**)

Annualized excess return is higher for the subset of
firms that have an ex-date between January 1981 and
December 1985.

This likely reflects the effect of the bull

market of the early-mid 1980's on stock prices in general
and the fact that the analysis begins in a year (1981) when
stock prices were depressed.

The average market-adjusted

return is largest for the 1970-1980 portfolio of firms, as
is the portfolio's level of systematic risk as measured by
average /3 (Please see Table 5.17, Panel B) across market
proxies (1.0).

Average /3s for the 1981-85 and 1986-88

portfolios are 0.94 and 0.93 respectively.

As a result,

the 1981-85 portfolio displays superior performance
relative to the other groupings based on the Treynor
criterion.
The Sharpe measure of portfolio performance indicates
that the two portfolios comprised of firms with ex-dates
during the 1980's have risk-adjusted returns that are
superior to the portfolio of firms that went ex-dividend
during the 1970's.

Results of an analysis using Jensen's

measure of portfolio performance are consistent with the
results reported above; on the whole, the calendar time
portfolios perform well relative to the market.

Each of

the three portfolios has significantly positive abnormal
returns when measured against at least one market proxy.
The portfolio formed of firms that went ex-dividend during
the 1970's appears to be the best performer when evaluated

130

against market proxies, consistent with the results of an
analysis of market-adjusted excess returns.
The strong performance of portfolios consisting of
spinoff firms over calendar time might be anticipated,
given the results of the analysis of the Before and After
portfolios.

Since the performance of both these portfolios

is, in general, not significantly different from that of
the market, adding the significantly positive returns
earned over the pre-spinoff period (APE = 2.67%) and the
event-day window (APE = 3.69%), should boost the
performance of the calendar time portfolio to significantly
positive levels.
It appears that an investor who pursues a strategy of
purchasing spinoff firms two years prior to the ex-date and
who holds those firms for a four year period can earn
positive returns relative to holding the market portfolio.
This is not inconsistent with (semi-strong form) market
efficiency, of course, since the announcement of a spinoff
and the ex-date are typically much closer in time than two
years.

Furthermore, much of the positive return is earned

during the pre-announcement period and on the announcement
day, so it seems that an investor must have inside
information to exploit this strategy.

CHAPTER 6:

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most important - and most consistently
obtained - result of the spinoff literature is the
association between an announcement of a spinoff and wealth
gains for shareholders of the announcing firm.

The

empirical evidence indicates that these wealth gains do not
come at the expense of the senior security holders.

The

source(s) of these wealth gains has (have) been the subject
of investigation since this phenomenon was first reported,
with less than satisfactory results.

That is, there does

not yet exist a generally accepted explanation for the
wealth gains that accrue to shareholders of firms that
announce a spinoff.
This work offers (and tests empirically) a new
hypothesis regarding the positive share price reaction to
spinoff news.

This is the PRNI hypothesis, which suggests

that the market response to a demerger announcement is
driven by investor sentiment during the announcement
period.

The PRNI hypothesis is tested by separating a

sample of spinoff announcements using the criterion of
market sentiment as a basis for categorization.

That is,

the stock price reaction induced by announcements that take
place during periods when investors are assumed to be
optimistic is compared to that observed for announcements
during pessimistic periods.

A result indicating higher
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share price reactions during periods of market optimism
would be consistent with the PRNI hypothesis.
In fact, when market (return) oriented proxies for
investor sentiment are applied to segregate the data into
optimistic and pessimistic groups, in general, the null
hypothesis of no difference between the groups can be
rejected.

On the other hand, when non-market proxies for

investor sentiment are used in the analysis, the stock
price reaction to the announcement of a spinoff is not
significantly different for the optimistic and pessimistic
groups.

The single exception to the general inconsistency

of non-market proxies with the PRNI hypothesis is the
percent change in the index of leading indicators.

This

surrogate for investor sentiment is significantly
correlated with the return on the market, however.

Thus,

it can be inferred that market-based factors are good
proxies for investor sentiment.
For the PRNI hypothesis to be acceptable, it must be
agreed upon that the market return is an appropriate
representation of investor sentiment and that other proxies
are not.

Given the decision-making heuristics and biases

that the PRNI hypothesis is predicated on, prior period
market return seems a natural choice as a proxy for
investor sentiment.

However, it is also possible that

prior period market return represents some other phenomenon
entirely, and it is not investor sentiment that drives the
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results reported in Chapter 4 of this study.

A final point

concerning the short-term effects of demergers is that
positive share price effects are observed even for
announcements that take place during periods of investor
pessimism.

Thus, although investor sentiment may influence

the stock price reaction to the announcement of a spinoff,
it cannot be entirely responsible for the observed
response.
Another aspect of corporate spinoffs is the long-term
performance of the shares of these firms.

Extant research

on this issue is scant and has focused on the post-spinoff
performance of the subsidiary firm.

For example, Cusatis,

Miles, and Woolridge (1991) find that a sample of spun off
firms outperform a market proxy and a sample of matched
firms, especially in the second year following the
distribution date.
The long-term post-spinoff performance of both parent
and subsidiary firms is examined here.

The result of this

examination indicates that the post-spinoff performance of
parent and subsidiary firms is not significantly different
from that of the market (with the exception of that of the
Parent portfolio relative to the S&P 500 index).
Differences between the results reported by Cusatis, Miles
and Woolridge and those obtained in this analysis for the
Subsidiary portfolio can be ascribed to choice of market
proxy and sampling technique, among other possibilities.
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The relative performance of spinoff firms before and
after the demerger is also investigated.

It is found that

the risk and market-adjusted performance of these firms
does not appear to change significantly post-spinoff.
Therefore, it appears that the separation of the subsidiary
from the parent firm does not substantially change the
risk-return characteristics of the whole, on average.

Thus

the long-term effect on shareholder wealth of a corporate
spinoff appears to be minimal.
Because share price performance is not significantly
lower post-spinoff, the short term effects of the demerger
announcement (the significant upward price drift prior to
the spinoff and the positive returns associated with
spinoff firms on the announcement day) do accrue to
investors.

As discussed above, investor sentiment may

influence the share price response to the announcement of a
spinoff, but cannot be solely responsible for it.

Given

the combination of long-term and short-term wealth effects
of spinoffs reported in this study, it is possible that
there exists some additional explanation (other than
investor sentiment) that is responsible for the wealth
gains associated with spinoffs.
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